The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board Accountability by Zhao, Jingchen & Li, Zhihui
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 15
Number 2 Summer 2019 Article 2
Summer 2019
The Regulatory Framework of Executive
Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder
Activism and Board Accountability
Jingchen Zhao
Zhihui Li
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jingchen Zhao and Zhihui Li, The Regulatory Framework of Executive Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder Activism and Board
Accountability, 15 Hastings Bus. L.J. 203 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol15/iss2/2
1 - EXECRENUMERATIONMACROFINAL SL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019 10:56 AM 
[203] 
The Regulatory Framework of Executive 
Remuneration: Contributions from Shareholder 
Activism and Board Accountability 
Professor Jingchen Zhao and Dr. Zhihui Li 
INTRODUCTION 
The economist Roger Bootle once argued that “the level of executive 
pay is a total and complete scandal.  There is a real crisis of capitalism 
about all this.  Where people are paying themselves tens of millions of 
pounds, it adds up to a form of expropriation.”1  The High Pay 
Commission in the UK emphasized that excessively high pay is “a 
symptom of a wider market failure based on a misunderstanding of how 
markets work at their best.”2  According to the Commission’s 
investigation, in 2011, even though economic growth was slow, 
executive remuneration in FTSE 100 companies3 had risen by 49% 
on average, compared with a 2.7% average increase in employees’ 
payments.4  It was suggested that the growing income gap between 
top executives and average employees might pose a threat to the 
companies’ long-term interests.5  To have a better understanding 
of the executive compensation problem, it is essential to undertake an 
in-depth analysis of the rationale for the awarding of 
  Professor of Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, 
Jingchen.Zhao@ntu.ac.uk 
  Juris Doctor candidate, Emory University Law School, zhihui.li@emory.edu 
1. Julia Finch, Jill Treanor & Richard Wachman, Critics Unite over Executive Pay to Force the
‘Aliens’ of Business down to Earth, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/busi 
ness/2010/mar/31/myners-urges-fsa-to-investigate-shareholders-role [perma.cc/YTR9-6JGL].  
2. The High Pay Commission, Cheques with Balance: Why Tackling High Pay is in the National
Interest, HIGH PAY CENTRE (2012), http://highpaycentre.org/files/Cheques_with_Balances.pdf [perma. 
cc/HZ8B-CD5J]. 
3. FTSE UK Index Series, FTSE RUSSEL, https://www.ftse.com/products/indices/uk
[perma.cc/8PTE-TL98] (defining FTSE 100 is the first 100 public companies listed in the LSE, and 
FTSE 250 is the companies listed from the 101st to 350th in the LSE). 
4. FTSE Statistics, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/stat
istics/ftse/ftse.htm perma.cc/Y7UM-239L]. 
5. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261–62 (1990). 
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compensation.  In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”) 
defines the board’s role as “to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the 
company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which 
enables risk to be assessed and managed.”6  Directors owe fiduciary duties 
to their companies, as well as a duty of care.7  The duty to avoid conflicts 
in the scope of fiduciary duties8 in particular requires a personal obligation 
to practice good conscience and loyalty to the company.  Because a 
“deficient” remuneration structure can encourage risk-taking and thereby 
cause damage to the company,9 directors should not be the parties who 
decide on the amount of their own remuneration.  They should neither 
permit someone who is dependent on the directors to decide on their 
remuneration, nor receive an “excessive and unreasonable” amount of 
money.10  Furthermore, it is often suggested that the shareholders, as the 
“owners” of the company, must be given the power to protect their 
interests, and they should have a right to express their views on executive 
remuneration or on the risks imposed by the company’s remuneration 
practices.11  
From a contract perspective, when directors are employed by the 
company they are bound by the company’s the certificate of incorporation. 
Problems may then appear if the company seeks to amend the terms of a 
director’s remuneration without complying with the articles.12  According 
to the Code, this problem can be resolved by introducing a claw-back 
provision to prevent rewards for failure.13  Despite the fact that topics 
related to the rationale and reasons for executive remuneration have been 
discussed, issues of how to regulate and the forms of regulation have been 
rarely examined.  The article aims to fill this gap. 
The article will focus on the measures and trajectory of executive 
remuneration regulation by addressing the following research question: if 
regulation is appropriate and the way forward, what form should it take to 
solve current executive remuneration problems?  The article will offer a 
6.  Corporate Governance Code 2016, FRC, 2016/April, sec. A, ¶ 1 (Eng.). 
7.  See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c.46, §§ 172, 174 (Eng.).
8.  See Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 175 (Eng.).
9.  Janice S. Miller, Robert M. Wilseman & Luis R. Gormez-Mejia, The Fit Between CEO
Compensation Design and Firm Risk, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 745, 754 (2002). 
10.  Joseph Lee, Regulatory regimes and norms for directors’ remuneration: EU, UK and Belgian
law compared, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 599, 603 (2012). 
11.  Id. at 609. 
12.  Id. at 612. 
13.  FRC, supra note 6, Schedule A (“Consideration should be given to the use of provisions that
permit the company to reclaim variable components in exceptional circumstances of misstatement or 
misconduct”).  Note, about Claw-back; see DAVID. L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE 
TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTORS, 63 (3d ed. 2003) (“A claw-back is required when 
managers take a contractual share of early investment gains that are subsequently reduced by losses”). 
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comprehensive analysis of three concerns, including pay for 
underperforming executives, shareholders’ difficulties in understanding pay 
reports, and the increasing pay gaps between executives and formal 
employees, followed by a critical analysis of possible solutions.  
Looking at the current attempts at legislative reform in this arena, the 
aims of governments in reforming executive remuneration practice are to 
promote long-term success for their public companies and economies, 
using the method of providing shareholders with stronger powers to 
securitize executives’ pay.  To empower shareholders with more voice on 
directors’ remunerations, a “say on pay” regime has become a global trend 
as an attempt to solve executive remuneration problems.  However, this 
global trend is subject to a number of uncertainties, such as: Is shareholder 
empowerment in terms of a say on pay able to assure long-term 
productivity?14  If shareholder empowerment is not as useful as 
governments think, are there any other methods within the domain of 
corporate governance to ensure pay for performance?  Will board 
accountability to shareholders in relation to executive pay be sufficient to 
improve pay design?  We will address these questions in this article, in 
order to provide a comprehensive answer to the issue of how to regulate 
remuneration.  
A functional and effective mechanism for setting executive 
remuneration will be proposed in a normative way.  If agency theory and 
managerial theory can be used as theoretical bases to prove that pay for 
performance is the final goal of setting executive managers’ remuneration, 
an effective way to achieve this final goal should be proposed.  The focus 
of this article is on how to achieve this goal effectively and efficiently, 
together with the challenges of designing a more appropriate and workable 
remuneration system.  The requirements for forming a good remuneration 
system will be discussed from several perspectives, such as the vesting 
period design of long-term incentive plans, the balance between motivation 
and punishment, and non-financial incentives in executive pay.  
We will consider the central relationships that emerge from practical 
factors between executive pay and shareholder intervention, board 
accountability and shareholder participation.  Good pay practices will be 
analyzed from the perspectives of the shareholders, the executive directors, 
the board, and employees.  
This article is an original attempt to establish a more effective 
regulatory framework for executive remuneration problems through 
shareholder empowerment, board accountability, and executive 
14.  Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard – Measures That Drive
Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 77. 
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remuneration design.  Current executive remuneration problems are 
categorized into two perspectives: pay for underperformance and deficient 
remuneration structures.  Building on existing research on current 
regulatory methods to solve remuneration problems and improve the 
system’s effectiveness, this article makes some original contributions to 
establishing detailed proposals for better regulatory frameworks and 
legislative instruments in a few respects.  These include adjusting 
shareholders’ voting rights and participation in voting for executive 
remuneration policies, emphasizing the board’s remuneration reporting and 
liabilities for directors’ failures in negotiating remuneration design, and 
improving remuneration design by requiring longer holding periods of 
executive’s incentive equities in the company.  
The article is organized in three subsections. Section I will explore the 
rationale for having a shareholder say on pay.  It will suggest that having 
shareholder power over remuneration policy making will not be harmful to 
the company’s long-term productivity.  Arguments will be made to support 
the point that shareholders, as a whole, belong to a separate group in 
corporate governance that tends to focus on the company’s long-term 
success.  The advantages and disadvantages of shareholder empowerment 
will be discussed from the say on pay experiences of the UK and the U.S. 
This section will demonstrate that shareholder intervention has a positive 
influence over issues of executive remuneration.  This section will also 
provide several suggestions for shareholders about how to improve their 
intervention.  
Section II will provide a discussion about the need for board 
accountability.  Contrary to shareholder empowerment, director primacy 
suggests that executive remuneration should not be subject to much, if any, 
interference from shareholders.  This section will provide evidence that 
board accountability is not adequate to solve remuneration problems and to 
promote a company’s long-term success without regulatory intervention. 
Problems and good examples of ways to solve these issues will be 
investigated, and several suggestions will be provided for how to improve 
accountability.  Several principles will be suggested for how to improve the 
board’s service when making remuneration reports.  
Section III will provide proposals for improving executive 
remuneration pay plans.  A summary of regulatory suggestions will provide 
guidance for how to adjust the pay structure to align pay and performance 
based on the spirit of company law and empirical evidence.  
Additionally, fairness issues in pay will be investigated.  There will be 
a discussion around employees participating in executive pay design and 
practice.  The shareholders’ say on pay, as a comparatively practical 
method to monitor executive pay, has not been recognized as the only way 
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to solve compensation problems.  The notion of having an employee say on 
pay has been mentioned by many scholars, although a workable method is 
difficult to be established.  Some suggestions for how to achieve a broader 
scope of say on pay will be provided in Section IV. 
 
I. SHAREHOLDER SAY ON PAY 
A. SHAREHOLDER POWER AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS  
 
Shareholder empowerment is a notion that legislation can adopt in order to 
provide investors with the power to monitor management issues in companies.  
However, a consensus has not been reached on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
shareholder intervention in companies.  Evidence from the financial crisis 2008 
showed that shareholders in the UK’s public companies were provided with a 
greater scope of power under company law and corporate governance in 
comparison with the U.S.  However, stock prices fell faster in the UK than they did 
in the U.S. during 2008, which led to a financial crisis in the UK as serious as that 
in the U.S.15  In terms of the history of UK company law legislation, it would be 
misleading to say that the basic features of modern companies, such as their 
separate personality, centralized management, limited liability, and the free 
transfer of shares, have evolved together to form today’s corporate model.16  
Nonetheless, these basic features were generated by law at different times and 
adjusted to later environments.17  
The two most common approaches created by company law legislations to 
enable shareholders to intervene in the management of companies include the exit 
channel and the voting channel.18  In public companies, shareholders can express 
their dissatisfaction and subsequently make an impact on managerial decisions by 
threatening to sell their shares, which may lead to a drop in the share price.  This 
threat to sell may not only influence the value of stocks held by the executive 
directors from their compensation, but also has negative effects on the reputation 
of the company19 and ultimately on the reputations of the executives.  The other 
way is for shareholders to express their opinions by voting against certain board 
 
 15.  Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008-9 Stock Market 
Meltdown?, 124 ECGI L. Working Paper 6 (2009). 
 16.  Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run, 417 U. OF 
CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPER CTR. FOR BUS. RES. 6 (2010) 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Konstantinos Stathopoulos & Geoigios Voulgaris, The Impact of Shareholder Activism: The 
case of say-on-pay, 24 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 359, 360 (2015).  
 19.  Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 THE J. 
OF FIN. 2481, 2493 (2009); see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The Wall Street Walk and 
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a form of voice, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2445, 2476–77 (2009).  
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decisions or directors at shareholders’ meetings.20  The shareholders’ say on pay is 
one factor in the second channel.  
In addition to agency theory, the high liquidity of capital markets also has a 
huge impact on the trajectory of corporate law and governance development.21  
The 2008 financial crisis generated huge concerns that the increasing liquidity of 
capital markets changed the ownership pattern of public companies—from family 
members to institutional shareholders through widely diversified pension funds 
and mutual funds.22  Furthermore, there is a trend towards shares to be held for 
relatively short periods, including those owned by institutional shareholders such 
as hedge funds, insurance policies, and securitized instruments.23  With the rapid 
increase of equity liquidation, the use of shareholder power can become 
complicated.  Since these shareholders make the presumption that their 
investments will only stay for a short time in one company, it is doubtful whether 
they will focus on the companies’ long-term interests when they vote on corporate 
policies, being more likely to sell their shares and terminate their interest in the 
company.  
Say on pay reforms, which enhanced shareholders’ powers to improve board 
accountability in the 1970s and the early 1990s, may have already conferred too 
much power on the shareholders.24  It has been suggested that these reforms may 
be erroneous in regulating shareholders’ power.  For example, institutional 
shareholders, who were more likely to make informed decisions, tended to see 
their equity capital contribution decline during the financial crisis.  Moreover, 
providing them with more power for intervention in management may cause other 
problems25 such as short-term rent-seeking behaviors and sudden extractions.  
Nonetheless, it may be too arbitrary to deny the necessity for regulations giving 
shareholders powers to influence public companies.  This can be explained by 
exploring the methods by which shareholders can intervene in the management of 
companies.  
Despite the fact that shareholder empowerment has been questioned in terms 
of whether it can be used to promote long-term productivity, it is accepted that 
shareholder engagement can be helpful in preventing companies from pursuing 
short-term success.  Roger Barker, Director of Corporate Governance of the 
Institute of Directors of Corporate Governance (IoD), when commenting on new 
 
 20.  R. Ashraf, N. Jayaraman & H.E. Ryan. Jr., Do Pension-related Business Ties Influence 
Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J. 
OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 567, 573 (2012). 
 21.  See Deakin, supra note 16, at 8. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Leslie Hannah, The Divorce of Ownership from Control 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined 
Global Historical Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404, 411 (2007).  
 24.  Biagio Marino, Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for 
Effective Executive Compensation Reform, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2016). 
 25.  Deakin, supra note 16, at 9. 
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2014 EU proposals for shareholders’ rights26 said that the IoD would agree with 
the commission’s overall objective of enhancing long-term, constructive 
engagement of institutional investors with listed companies.27 
Long-term success and long-term productivity are phrases that appear in 
almost every reform document on executive compensation.28  The World 
Economic Forum defines long term success as a company that is an attractive long 
term investment for potential shareholders, who can invest with the expectation of  
“holding an asset for an indefinite period of time.”29  It may also be the main 
reason why governments choose to give shareholders the power of say on pay.  
The UK’s binding say on pay was provided because of pressure from institutional 
investors and the outrage of the public.30  Nevertheless, the long-term success of 
public companies and the equity market still primarily relies on all the factors 
which influence regulations, and also the same goals that governments and 
shareholders are expecting.  
The goal of long-term success is the reason why executive remuneration is 
often equity-based.  Tying executives’ pay packages to a company’s stock price 
incentivize executives to work hard for the interest of the company and the 
shareholders with the focus on the company’s long-term success.31  If executive 
compensation is only a base salary, there is no incentive to remain at that 
company; an executive could easily jump ship to a more lucrative company, 
without losing any unvested equity in their current role.32  However, compared 
with directors, shareholders are more long-term focused.  A survey by Graham, 
Harvey and Rajgopal suggested that 78% of executives would sacrifice the 
company’s long-term success to meet short-term earnings targets to attract more 
investment.33  Even for those shareholders who are more likely to have a short-
 
 26.  See Press Release, European Commission, European Commission proposes to strengthen 
shareholder engagement and introduce a “say on pay” for Europe’s largest companies (Apr. 9 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm?locale=en [perma.cc/4RT4-XU4B]. 
 27.  Trade Union Congress, Beyond Shareholder Value: The reasons and choices for corporate 
governance reform, https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/BSV.pdf [perma.cc/PLF4-LAW5] at 17. 
 28.  See, e.g., Dept. for Bus., Energy & Industrial Strategy, Directors’ pay: revised remuneration 
reporting regulations (June 27, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/directors-pay-revi 
sed-remuneration-reporting-regulations [perma.cc/J2YL-C9WM]; Dept. for Business, Innovation & 
Skills, Executive pay: consultation on enhanced shareholder voting rights, (Mar. 14, 2012) https:// 
www.gov.uk/government/consultations/executive-pay-consultation-on-enhanced-shareholder-voting-
rights [perma.cc/GR2H-RH2B]; Luis A. Aguilar, The Ceo Pay Ratio Rule: A Workable Solution For 
Both Issuers and Investors, SEC (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-
open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html [perma.cc/H944-YGV6] at 8. 
 29.  World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Councils, Long-term Investing (2012), http:// 
reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/long-term-investing/ [perma.cc/CZ9E-EVG8]. 
 30.  163 Parl Deb HC (13th ser.) (2012) col. 4 (UK). 
 31.  Michael Jenson & Kevin Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 
22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 64, 70 (2010).  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  John Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate 
Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4 (2005).  
1 - EXECRENUMERATIONMACROFINAL SL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  10:56 AM 
210 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 15:2 
term outlook, such as hedge fund investors who hold shares for a period of one or 
two years, their perspective focuses on the long-term profits of the company, since 
they only buy shares when the price is relatively cheap.34  
Shareholders who focus on the long-term interests of the company will help to 
increase the corporate value.  Edmans noted that shareholders with a considerable 
holding of shares can influence a public company’s management through market 
efficiency.35  Contrary to the traditional view of corporate governance, he argued 
that shareholders can improve corporate value even by using the exit channel, 
namely threatening to sell their shares.36  For shareholders, especially shareholders 
with a relatively large holding of shares—the “blockholders” referred to by 
Edmans—a large holding of shares increases their intervention and monitoring 
incentives.  A new way of thinking about shareholders was proposed by viewing 
them as informed traders instead of controlling entities.37  These shareholders 
would collect more information about the companies, not only internally but also 
from the markets.38  This information will help them to establish more accurate and 
informed opinions about the value of the company.  If their voices are ignored at 
meetings or their share value decreases, shareholders will trade in their shares.  
Having several blockholders trade in their shares at the same time may be 
dangerous and harmful for companies if the share price drops quickly and there is a 
significant reputation loss.39  Pressure like this will force the board to listen to 
shareholders and may help to enhance corporate value indirectly.  
Moreover, this difference in short-term and long-term focus between directors 
and shareholders leads to agency costs.40  To stop the directors, especially 
executive directors, from using the information or power available to them due to 
their position to satisfy their own interests, companies may incentivize directors 
with remuneration packages involving equities, in order to align their interests with 
those of the shareholders.  On the other hand, shareholders need to use their voting 
power on executive remuneration, which may involve out-of-pocket expenses if 
they have to obtain expertise from professional institutions to understand 
remuneration reports and make decisions.  
Deakin provides two reasons why current reforms are empowering 
shareholders in terms of corporate governance issues.41  First, because agency 
theory has been justified by reforms in corporate governance since the 1990s, it is 
now the shareholders’ right and their duty to ensure that executives are making the 
right decisions on issues in relation to companies cash flow, while the 
 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Edmans, supra note 19, at 2438. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are short-
term institutions better informed, 22 REV. OF FIN. STU. 893, 897 (2009). 
 39.  Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 6 ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 23, 30 
(2014). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See Deakin, supra note 16, at 8. 
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shareholders’ standard of capital returns is usually stricter than the board’s when 
they are monitoring projects to make sure the firm reaps benefits and can provide 
stable employment.  Second, shareholders may have a “rent-seeking” purpose, 
tending to use the liquidity of capital at their disposal to “extract” benefits from the 
company’s business.  Similar to directors’ rent-seeking behaviors, shareholder 
rent-seeking, such as that undertaken by hedge fund managers, may destroy a 
company’s long-term success and be detrimental to other constituencies.  
Even if we disregard the first concerns around short-term shareholding 
influences on investors in corporate policymaking, the second important question 
is whether these shareholders are sincerely interested in interfering in executive 
remuneration.  In addition to the shareholders’ willingness and incentives to 
interfere with executive remuneration, shareholder intervention in management 
policies has not been optimistically regarded because of information asymmetry 
problems.  It has been suggested that shareholders are reluctant to intervene in 
management issues, and while voting outcomes are ignored by boards and CEOs, 
shareholders will put little effort into changing these policies.42 
Therefore, in relation to problems surrounding shareholder empowerment, it is 
uncertain whether the regulation is still valid in providing shareholders with the 
right to interfere in remuneration policy, and it is questionable whether the use of 
shareholder voting will be beneficial for the company’s long-term productivity.  
These questions will be analyzed next. 
Myners proposed in his report that although institutional shareholders had 
claimed the predominant place in the UK, these investors were still reluctant to 
intervene in their investee companies even when the companies were 
underperforming.43  However, Myners later suggests that if shareholders were 
given the power to intervene in decisions about managers’ pay, they would be 
capable of making decisions on how to make the best of situations.44  Under 
Myners’ logic, shareholders can be active in voting and making decisions for 
companies if they are empowered with a proper design for their intervention.  
Sheehan mentioned that “there is an iterative process in the regulation of executive 
remuneration practice and thus the potential for evolution in executive 
remuneration practice influenced by evolutions in the activities of disclosure, 
engagement and voting”.45  Moreover, the following statement in the Impact of 
Assessment of Improvement of Transparency of Executive Remuneration 
emphasizes the importance of providing shareholders with more power on 
remuneration:  
 
 42.  Flip Chart Fairy Tales, Will Shareholder Empowerment Curb the Executive Pay?, (May 28, 
2018, 12:33 AM), https://flipchartfairytales.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/will-shareholder-empowerment-
curb-executive-pay/ [perma.cc/RD48-E4EN]. 
 43.  Paul Myners, Myners Review of Institutional Investment in the UK, The Government 
Response, HM Treasury & The Department for Work & Pension, 2001, at 11. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Kym Sheehan, The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia, 31 
SYDNEY L. REV. 273, 278 (2009). 
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shareholder empowerment lies at the heart of the UK’s 
corporate governance framework and the proposed reforms are 
consistent with that approach.  Shareholders will be in a stronger 
position to promote a clearer link between pay and performance, 
ensuring that companies act in the best interests of their ultimate 
owners and contributing to a better functioning corporate sector 
more generally.46  
 
In October 2014 the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (now 
replaced by Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy) published a 
report on the implementation of the Kay Review, with the purpose of building a 
sustainable environment for long-term equity investment in the UK.  From the 
perspectives of encouraging effective engagement and stewardship, improving 
narrative reporting, forming trust-based relationships between investors and 
companies and fixing the misalignment of incentives that would undermine this 
trust, this report aims at increasing shareholder involvement in company issues.47  
In addition, the FRC offered their Stewardship Code to improve institutional 
shareholders’ stewardship responsibilities and their monitoring activities.48  This is 
a new era for corporate governance, especially from the perspective of shareholder 
intervention.  Investors, especially institutional shareholders, tend to focus more on 
the companies’ long-term business.  Institutional shareholders are also agents for 
other entities.  
Furthermore, the remuneration principles set out by these giant investors, 
including the National Association of Pension Funds (“NAPF”), Hermes Equity 
Ownership Services, the BT Pension Scheme, RPMI Railpen Investment, and USS 
Investment Management, suggest that management should make a material long-
term investment in the shareholders of the businesses they manage, and the best 
way to align the interests of shareholders and executives is via the ownership of 
shares over the long term, with “ownership obligations increasing with 
seniority.”49  With efforts from both investors and government, the empowerment 
of shareholders in voting will promote the healthier development of pay practice 
and long-term success for companies in relation to executive remuneration.  This is 
supported by the following reasons. 
The first reason why shareholders are provided with power over executive pay 
is that one important purpose of setting remuneration is to align the interests of 
 
 46.  Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Impact Assessment (IA), Improved 
Transparency of Executive Remuneration Reporting, 2012, REF 12/889, at 7. 
 47.  Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-
Term Decision Making: Implementation progress report, 2014, REF: BIS/14/1157, at 8. 
 48.  FRC, UK Stewardship Code, September 2012.  
 49.  NAPF et al., Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-term Business Success, 
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0351_remuneration_principles_for_building_ 
and_reinforcing%20_longterm_business_success_nov2013.aspx. 
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principal and agent, while decreasing the risks of investors’ shareholdings.  There 
are reasons to be suspicious of shareholders’ influence on long-term productivity.  
Institutional shareholdings pool money from investors and entrust this wealth to an 
asset company, while the investing contracts are made by investors, mutual fund 
managers, and the company.  They normally have few incentives to rein in any 
excessive risks that executive managers may take (for the purpose of increasing 
directors’ pay);50 in voting on the resolutions of the company, they are “reluctant 
activists.”51  These investors have no direct relationship with the investing 
company and therefore will not initiate proposals as regularly as other investors.  
On the other hand, the goal of fund managers is likely to be short-term, since the 
performance valuation of the fund is based on annual comparison with peer 
groups, and thus they seldom have incentives to interfere in corporate governance 
issues, let alone the executive remuneration policy, of the investing company.52  
Nonetheless, this indirect relation does not stop investors like this having more 
power over voting, and intervening in executive pay policy and reports.  Bebchuk 
proposes that although mutual funds are not a good basis for investors and fund 
managers to initiate management of the company, the other large institutional 
shareholders will provide a trend in favor of voting on resolutions for these 
investors to follow.53  From another perspective,  shareholders are not that 
dissatisfied about current executive remuneration designs, which contain bonuses, 
equity options, pensions, and other benefits for managers.  
Moreover, evidence from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an 
international shareholders’ voting agency which provides services to nearly 1,600 
institutions globally and is “a leading provider of proxy advisory and corporate 
governance solutions to financial market participants,”54 shows that shareholders 
pay attention to remuneration policy making and reporting, and with certain 
perspectives developing from this attention, they can promote the companies’ 
long-term profits.  
In the ISS’s 2014 survey of pay for performance alignment opinions among 
105 institutional shareholders from the UK, the U.S., continental Europe, Canada, 
and the Asia-Pacific region, the findings revealed some of the shareholders’ 
opinions when they voted on executive pay reports.55  Their survey focused on 
issues of company performance goal setting, executive pay level, investors’ say on 
pay, and managers’ income comparison in the same industries.  
 
 50.  John Coffee, Liquidity Verses Control: The Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitor, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1333 (1991). 
 51.  Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., 148 (Jan-
Feb, 1994). 
 52.  EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 78 (2005).  
 53.  Lucian Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1796 (2006). 
 54.  ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results, (Sept. 2014), http://www.issgover 
nance.com/iss-releases-results-annual-global-voting-policy-survey/ [perma.cc/8R3H-Q44D]. 
 55.  Id. at 5, 10. 
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According to this survey, 60% of the shareholders would still be concerned 
about the company’s report on pay levels, even if the company’s performance was 
better than other peer companies in the same industry.  Nineteen percent would 
prefer an absolute limit on the pay level.  Fourteen percent would support 
proportional limits on remuneration in relation to the company’s absolute 
performance.56  As for the say on pay issue, 63% of the shareholder respondents 
indicated that if there were positive changes in the implementation of pay policy in 
the second and third years, they would be less concerned and more enthusiastic 
about the policy they have voted for.57  With respect to European institution 
respondents, 83% of the respondents expressed their interest in peer group pay 
level comparison.58 
The following table represents some of the results of the survey and shows the 
attitudes of the shareholders and companies towards corporate goals and 
remuneration design.  Forty-three percent of the shareholders thought that if the 
directors’ performance targets were lowered their compensation levels should 
change in line with performance targets, and only 19% of shareholders were 
willing to pass pay packages without performance linked to them in order to attract 
talented executives.59  
 
Source: ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results 
 
The ISS report did not give their conclusion and comments on this survey, but 
from these statistics, a large proportion of institutional shareholders from various 
countries indicated their concerns with the level of pay, the alignment between pay 
and performance, the implementation of pay policy, and also comparison in terms 
of pay levels within peer groups.  Although these concerns are presented on a 
 
 56.  Id. at 5, 10. 
 57.  Id. at 5, 10. 
 58.  Id. at 5, 11. 
 59.  Id. at 9. 
Q: Which of the following best reflects your institution’s 
idea of the relationship between goal setting and award 
values? 
Share- 
holder 
Board 
1. If performance goals are significantly reduced, target 
award levels should be commensurately modified to 
reflect the expected lower level of performance.
43% 3% 
2. Performance goals should be set independently of 
target awards, which must be maintained at competitive 
levels in order to attract and retain top quality executives
19% 25% 
3. The compensation committee should have broad 
discretion to set both goals and target awards at levels 
deemed to be appropriate under the circumstances
26% 67% 
4. Other 12% 5% 
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general scale, some guidelines drawn up by large institutional shareholders to 
promote best practice in terms of executive compensation will be analyzed later.  
With the influence from this large proportion of shareholders who are sympathetic 
to promoting pay for performance, Bebchuk’s previous assumption that the voting 
ideas of several active institutional shareholders can influence other shareholders 
and change their ideas in voting may be proved correct, even if other short-term 
shareholding investors may hold different voting opinions on remuneration reports 
before annual meetings.60  Thus, emphasizing investor power in pay policy making 
and reporting may be a trustworthy method of improving compensation 
governance. 
The second reason for empowering shareholders in terms of executive pay is 
that legislation may be an easier route to empower shareholders, since it is hard to 
ensure board accountability on executive remuneration.  The details of 
remuneration reports and policies which are presented for resolution must be 
emphasized, which reflects the general requirements of various regulations on 
compensation and transparency.  Although there are concerns over whether 
shareholders will be qualified by the law to make decisions in relation to corporate 
governance, Bebchuk suggests that the legislative choice is always between giving 
shareholders powers to influence the running of the company, or leaving the 
boardroom to maintain its “indefinite” control, with executives having managerial 
influence over the board.61 We are convinced that the former should be considered 
as the preferred choice for legislation on executive remuneration, providing the 
shareholder with powers to review and supervise the board on executive 
remuneration policies.  Empirical evidence to be explored in the following section 
will illustrate that allowing shareholders to review and supervise the board in 
remuneration policy making will help to reduce the undue influence of executives 
over the board.  Additionally, some problems related to shareholders’ say on pay in 
practice will be summarized to allow for further discussion.  
 
B. SHAREHOLDERS AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION: EXPERIENCES OF THE U.S. 
AND THE UK IN APPLYING ADVISORY VOTES 
 
Investors in UK listed companies perceive the say on pay as a valuable 
monitoring mechanism, and have successfully used this power to stop executive 
remuneration levels from growing rapidly while increasing the sensitivity of pay to 
poor performance.62  With the international trend towards empowering 
shareholders in terms of managers’ remuneration issues and the globalized flow of 
capital, this shareholder voting influence on executive compensation shows general 
 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the 
UK, 17 REV. OF FIN. 527, 555 (2013). 
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similarity across developed countries.63  
In 2009, Conyon and Sadler published a report on how shareholders reacted to 
the UK’s regulatory shareholders’ non-binding vote, investigating a large sample 
from nearly 50,000 voting resolutions of quoted companies during the period from 
2002 to 2007.64  According to their research, it is rare among shareholders to show 
absolute dissent to executive remuneration reports, with only seven to 10% 
demonstrating total dissent across five years.65  Shareholders in the UK were 
satisfied with companies’ pay policies; over 90% voted in favor of the reports, and 
moreover this approval increased over the period.66  Nonetheless, in comparison 
with other proposals such as nomination and non-pay policies proposed by the 
board, shareholders demonstrate a higher level of dissent in relation to 
remuneration reports.67  
Evidence showed a negative correlation between shareholders’ positive votes 
and the level of executive remuneration, which proposed that boards reacted 
quickly to shareholders’ concerns about provisions such as rewards for failure after 
the enactment of the UK advisory shareholder say on pay in 2002.68  More 
significantly, poor performance by executive managers was more strongly 
correlated with steep penalties.69  However, boards responded to shareholders’ 
dissatisfaction by adjusting the total level of executive pay, but not the structure of 
it,70 which still remains a potential issue since the level will influence one year’s 
pay but the structure, especially an equity pay design, will affect pay over the 
longer term. 
Concerning shareholder advisory votes, Ferri and Maber investigated seventy-
five public companies that experienced a more than 20% shareholder veto on 
executive pay reports.71  The boards of these companies provided their revised pay 
policies with changes mainly introduced in two areas: existing executive contract’s 
notice periods, and executive pay’s performance-based conditions.72  After the 
shareholders showed their dissatisfaction towards the pay plan, sixteen companies 
reduced the executives’ notice period from twenty-four months to twelve months, 
while managers’ golden goodbyes were reduced to nearly half of the original 
63.  Nuno Fernandes, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos & Kevin Murphy, Are US CEOs Paid More?
New International Evidence, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 323, 325 (2013). 
64.  Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Director’s Remuneration Report
Legislation: Say On Pay in the UK, 18(4) CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 296, 297 (2010). 
65.  Id. at 301, 303. 
66.  Id. at 308–09. 
67.  Id. at 22. 
68.  Mary Carter & Valentina Zamora, Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO Compensation
Design, AAA 2008 MAS Meeting Paper, at 24 (Nov., 2007); see also Walid Alissa, Boards’ Response 
to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK, 24 EUR. ACCT. 
REV. 727, 750 (2015). 
69.  Ferri & Maber, supra note 62, at 534. 
70.  Alissa, supra note 68, at 728. 
71.  Ferri & Maber, supra note 62, at 536. 
72. Id .
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amount.73  The findings of this research confirmed that boards tend to reduce levels 
and other obvious factors in pay plans if there is strong dissatisfaction among 
shareholders.  
Although shareholders’ voting activities show an optimistic trajectory towards 
company pay plans since the 2002, the 2008 financial crisis  definitely caused 
alarm for shareholders and governments, not only reminding them of the 
nonfeasance of boards, but also hastening legislation to provide an efficient 
solution.74 
In the U.S., except for several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act enforced in 
2011, the impact of the remaining areas was uncertain.  “Many companies are 
hedging their bets and will respond in more detail once the SEC confirms the 
rules,” said Gregg Passin, a partner in Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the 
US.75  Meanwhile, institutional shareholders continue to “exert a strong influence 
on pay discussions but with around ninety-eight percent of US companies having 
passed their say on pay resolutions in 2011 and 2012, it is fair to say that progress 
is being made.”76  Moreover, Mark Hoble, a partner in Mercer’s Executive 
Rewards team in the UK, commented that 
companies are considering the appropriateness of their historic 
pay decisions through the lenses of current public perception and 
economic performance.  We are seeing companies undertake 
scenario modeling for their planned pay policies.  This is an essential 
and sensible part of corporate risk and reputation management.77 
Although the advisory say on pay was not implemented until 2010 in the US, 
shareholder proposals for transparency in executive pay, especially from 
institutional shareholders, had already increased significantly.  Research has shown 
that from 2002 to 2007, shareholders in 134 companies voted negatively on the 
boards’ executive pay proposals in their annual general meetings, leading to $7.3 
million deduction in CEOs’ pay overall.78  Concerns about the structure and equity 
design component of executive pay from institutional shareholders were also 
revealed, even before the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act.79  One goal of US 
73.  Id.
74.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
 (2012). 
75.  Viola Lloyd, Shareholder Spring Goes Global, THE HR DIRECTOR (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.thehrdirector.com/features/miscellaneous/shareholder-spring-goes-global/ [perma.cc/MRS
6-SGA9].
76.  Id.
77.  Id.
78.  Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24
REV. OF FIN. STUD. 535, 544–45 (2009). 
79.  Fabrizio Ferri & Tatina Sandino, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting
and Compensation: The case of employee options expensing, 84 THE ACCT. REV. 433, 453 (2009). 
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regulation is to promote more transparent executive compensation and better 
alignment of CEO incentives with shareholders’ interests.80  
Studies have shown say on pay played a positive role in achieving this goal. 
According to Kronlund and Sandy, having a say on pay vote can make companies 
change how they pay executives.81  However, despite the law’s intention to 
improve executive pay practices, the say on pay mandate has not unambiguously 
resulted in more reasonable CEO compensation.82  Contrary to the regulation’s 
goal to reduce executive pay, the net result of these changes may raise total 
executive compensation.  The fact that companies change pay practices between 
fiscal years, with or without shareholders voting again, is evidence that pay 
practices are not optimal.  If they were, whether a vote is held or not should be 
irrelevant for pay. 
In the U.S., shareholders of 2,173 public companies “overwhelmingly” 
approved their companies’ compensation reports in 2013.83  Ninety-seven percent 
of the U.S. public companies received shareholder votes affirming the CEOs’ pay, 
while only 57 companies experienced a shareholder advisory veto on their pay 
proposals.84  Evidence from the U.S. advisory vote has shown that when there is 
increased shareholder scrutiny, the board does alter executive pay policies: salaries 
are lower while grants of restricted stock are higher.85  Compensation practices that 
are vetoed by activist investors, such as golden parachutes, are reduced or 
eliminated.86  These changes are consistent with the trajectory of improving the 
transparency of pay and complying with proxy advisory companies’ guidelines, 
which may help companies to ensure that the say on pay vote passes.  However, 
despite these changes, the net effect is still a higher overall level of pay.87  
Additionally, companies make greater use of less scrutinized forms of executive 
pay, such as pensions and golden goodbyes, if there is increased shareholder 
monitoring.88  
Say on pay is not a complete panacea.  For instance, there is a crucial 
shortcoming in the say on pay legislation in the U.S.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires 
companies to have a shareholder vote on pay policies every second or third year.89  
However, it also enables companies to “strategically shift pay” across years to 
continue compensating executives in the same way that they used to while also 
 
 80.  See Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, supra note 18. 
 81.  Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive 
Compensation? (Dec. 3, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358696 [perma.cc/2NDZ-45QJ].  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  John Carney, Why Say on Pay Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing, CNBC (July 3, 2013, 
6:03AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100860959 [https://perma.cc/2E4A-Y5B5]. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholder’s Votes Have Done Little to Curb Lavish Executive Pay, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2015. 
 88.  See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81, at 19. 
 89.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), § 951. 
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gaining shareholder support, thereby potentially undermining the goals of the 
regulation to decrease the level of executive pay.90  
Therefore, it can be concluded that overall the advisory say on pay regulations 
in the U.S. and the UK have brought several positive changes in executive 
remuneration.  These changes were not only reflected in the boards’ reaction to 
shareholder dissatisfaction but also in the general level of it, although the structural 
design of pay is still in great need of improvement and scrutiny.  
From the shareholder’s perspective, although regulations have given a say on 
pay to improve board accountability to shareholders, the board or the remuneration 
committee can still find opportunities to undermine shareholder engagement. 
Shareholders’ negative responses to a pay policy will be delivered before the 
policy is taken to resolution, but these negative responses may not be turned into 
revisions because of game-playing between  shareholders and the remuneration 
committee. The concern from the U.S. say on pay experience would be that more 
engagement and increased transparency in pay may not necessarily lead to board 
accountability and shareholder diligence to influence a change in the pay policy.91  
Providing shareholders with voting power to decide on executive pay policy 
has been accepted and implemented as a useful tool by governments as a warning 
and monitoring mechanism.  Empirical evidence has also shown that this voting 
power has several effects in improving the practice of managers’ compensation 
plans and reporting.  However, it is also worth mentioning three main 
shortcomings, as follows: (1) shareholders tend to be dissatisfied when boards 
change the level of executive remuneration, but they always ignore the structure of 
pay plans, and sometimes it is difficult for shareholders to understand the pay 
structure; (2) shareholders’ voting powers have not stopped pay for failure, and 
golden goodbyes and golden hellos can be camouflaged in other ways by the 
board; and (3) governments have too often focused on the voting power of the 
shareholders, neglecting to examine how to increase the engagement of 
shareholders in the pay setting progress, and how to enhance conversations 
between shareholders and boards.  The following suggestions will deal with these 
problems. 
 
C. MEASURES TO IMPROVE SHAREHOLDER INTERVENTION  
 
It is comparatively easier to regulate listed companies by requiring their 
boards to act to serve the interests of shareholders, with few regulations requiring 
or encouraging shareholders to do anything.  However, from the perspective of 
executive remuneration, shareholders may need further instructions and guidelines 
from regulation.  From the discussion above, shareholders would like to have 
strong involvement in remuneration reports at AGMs, because remuneration 
 
 90.  See Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 81 at 19. 
 91.  KYM SHEEHAN, THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: GREED, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAY ON PAY 76 (2012). 
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reports detail how the payouts of the companies are set, which or part of which 
could have contributed to shareholders’ dividends.  
To encourage shareholders to participate in remuneration decisions with 
companies to a greater extent, and to improve boards’ accountability, current 
legislation and corporate codes from various governments have paid significant 
attention to regulating pay transparency and the disclosure of details in pay 
policies.  In terms of pay policy disclosure and shareholder understanding of 
problems, it may be wiser to prioritize the quality of pay transparency over its 
quantity.  Shareholders will be responsible for understanding pay structures and 
single elements of each pay plan, in order to facilitate better communications with 
companies.  
From the discussions above, it is time for the development of stewardship 
codes, which regulate shareholders in terms of how they approach their roles in 
corporate governance. Except for some remuneration guidelines drawn up by 
institutional shareholder groups mentioned above, organizations such as the FRC 
in the UK and the ICGN (International Corporate Governance Network) based in 
the U.S. have provided stewardship codes to give guidance to institutional 
shareholders so that they can participate more effectively in corporate issues.92 
Feedback and improvement of these codes is ongoing and will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
i.  Participation and Understanding 
 
It is difficult for most individual investors to understand remuneration reports. 
Even board members and other managers may find it difficult to understand their 
pay packages, which may contain equity plans, long- and short-term targets, 
earnings per share or total shareholder returns.93  Shareholders, especially small 
group investors, are encouraged to play a more active role in scrutinizing 
remuneration reports and communicating with directors.  Institutional shareholders 
with in-house experts who can analyze remuneration reports and provide advice, 
such as the GC100 group, the ABI and NAPF, always renew their guidelines for 
executive pay reporting.  These guidelines provide details on te formation and 
content of remuneration reports to explain every element of directors’ pay 
packages. Individual investors should be encouraged to read these guidelines if 
they have difficulty understanding remuneration reports.   
There are various forms and data in the remuneration reports, and shareholders 
should use their discretion and business judgment to determine whether the pay 
policy or the implementation report is fair and reasonable.  With the help of the 
ISS and other consultancies, institutional shareholders can easily reach a general 
 
 92.  FRC, supra note 48; see also International Corporate Governance Network, Global 
Stewardship Principles (May 28, 2018), http://icgn.flpbks.com/icgn-global-stewardship-principles/#p=1 
[perma.cc/Y5BR-YZWH] [hereinafter ICGN].  
 93.  Michael Skapinker, Executive Pay: The battle to align risks and rewards, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2015. 
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understanding of executive pay plans and reports.  
From the voting perspective, stewardship codes have provided a good 
foundation to encourage institutional investors to share their voting policies and 
results, letting the other shareholders have a general understanding of how better 
informed shareholders consider the pay plan and vote on it.  The ICGN’s Global 
Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should disclose and develop 
their actual voting policies and records, seeking to explain to companies the 
reasons underlying why they voted against any pay policies before the 
shareholders’ meeting.94  The stewardship code contains an innovative but maybe 
not very practical idea, proposing that investors should be open to joining and 
collaborating with other investors from both domestic and overseas arenas to 
leverage the voice of minority shareholders and exert influence over corporate 
decisions.95  Despite its positive impact to improve relationships and 
communication among various shareholders, this idea involves a few reservations 
that need further consideration.  Timing could be a thorny issue, since not all 
shareholders may be able or willing to have discussions about decisions before a 
resolution at a company’s AGM.  Moreover, the cost of gathering the shareholders 
may be considerable, with additional agency costs, especially in jurisdictions with 
dispersed ownership such as the U.S. and the UK.  
Institutional shareholders, e.g., pension fund managers, banks, insurance 
companies and so on, are companies built upon the interests of their beneficiaries.  
The UK Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should report 
periodically on their stewardship and voting activities to their clients or 
beneficiaries in terms of how they have discharged their responsibilities.96  In a 
ICGN meeting, Stout proposed pressure from beneficiaries could make 
institutional investors concerned about their investments.  Under certain 
circumstances, they may hold shares for a rather short period and sell them in a 
liquid market, though institutional investors are supposed to be long-term 
focused.97  Although institutional investors have great influence over corporate 
governance public companies, concern about their clients’ benefits and paybacks 
will decrease their impact as valuable investors providing good guidance for small 
shareholders.  However, rather than falling within the scope of the stewardship 
code, this question relates to corporate governance codes and company law 
legislations in general.  It is for the boards of investee companies to provide 
methods to retain their institutional shareholders in the long term, such as 
increasing their voting power or paybacks according to their length of investment 
 
 94.  ICGN, supra note 92, at 18 (Principle 5, Exercising voting rights in an informed and 
responsible manner). 
 95.  Id. at 16 (Principle 4, Engaging companies and collaborating with other investors). 
 96.  FRC, supra note 48 at Stewardship Code, Principle 7. 
 97.  Interview by Peter Montagnon with Stephen Haddrill, Rahki Kumar, Lynn Stout, and 
Motoyuki Yufu, Share Ownership in A Global Context  Is Stewardship Working?, ICGN (May 28, 
2018), https://www.icgn.org/share-ownership-global-context-stewardship-working-0 [perma.cc/AZ3L-
NQ8D]. 
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in the company.  
These methods, which are called time-weighted voting or time-weighted 
dividends, have been proved to be effective in attracting long term investors and 
lead investors to focus on the long-term interests of the company.  A recent study 
suggested time-weighted voting, which provides a shareholder with more votes per 
share if they hold shares for at least three years, can empower long-term investors 
and may improve corporate value.98  The empirical evidence shows that compared 
with dual-class shareholding which lets investors hold two different classes of 
shares to vote, time-weighted voting is a better choice for companies and 
shareholders to prevent “myopic” or short-term focused behavior among 
managers.99  
As mentioned above, if companies can provide efficient methods to retain 
shareholders’ investments or help them to focus on a long-term view, shareholders 
may be able to influence companies positively from their perspective and use their 
two intervention channels to help companies to create remuneration policies and 
reports reflecting long-term value.  
 
ii.  Principles 
 
Taking the UK Stewardship Code as an example, it is not enough to require 
that institutional shareholders should disclose their voting policy and records or be 
willing to act collectively with other investors.100  With the improvement of 
transparency in various reports at AGMs, especially in remuneration reports, 
shareholders need more time to analyze and understand the reports. Absorbing 
opinions from each other is important.  Thus, principle 5 of this code could be 
revised to: Institutional investors should be willing to meet with other investors 
before resolution and act collectively with other investors where appropriate. 
In order to promote the long-term success of the company, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code provides that it is the board’s role to provide effective controls 
and methods to ensure this objective.101  However, there is no follow-up section 
that provides detailed measures for how this should be done.  Section E the Code 
merely requires that the board should establish a satisfactory dialogue with 
shareholders.102  A stronger addition should propose a new method to retain 
shareholders’ investment for long-term periods.  
Improving the shareholder monitoring function during the creation of 
executive remuneration policies and reports does not necessarily mean that 
shareholder value is the only goal that should be considered while setting 
 
 98.  Lynne Dallas & Jordan Barry, Long-term Shareholders and Time-phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. 
OF CORP. L., 541, 552–53 (2015). 
 99.  Id. at 546–47. 
 100.  FRC, supra note 48 at Stewardship Code, Principles 5–6.  
 101.  FRC, supra note 6 at Corporate Governance Code 2016, S A.1.  
 102.  Id. at section E.1.  
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managers’ pay.  Boards may also take other issues into consideration when 
planning and implementing pay policies.  
II. REMUNERATION PRACTICE AND BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Historically, shareholders have long been seen as passive, or even irrelevant to 
the running of companies in the development of modern corporate theories.103  
Shareholder value was even neglected during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, since what shareholders did to exercise their ownership was vote at AGMs 
which were mostly formalities, while the board had the power to delegate 
management to executives who were professionals but had no stock in the 
company.104  Another argument around shareholder empowerment suggests 
increasing shareholder involvement will shift the balance between the board’s 
authority and its accountability.105  Despite the fact that it may be easier for the 
shareholders to set guidelines for an effective remuneration policy, under most 
circumstances they would still not be efficiently or adequately informed about 
what is happening in the boardroom. 
Following the 1995 Greenbury Report’s proposal that executive pay should 
comprise more long-term incentives to promote the notion of “pay for 
performance,” the percentage of equity incentives in pay packages, such as 
restricted equity options and long-term incentive plans, has increased.  The average 
of the FTSE 100 CEOs’ equity option value was 240% of their salary level in 
2015, compared to 210% in 2014.106  However, emphasizing long-term incentives 
and more equity options in pay packages cannot effectively bring about an optimal 
scenario by following agency theory, i.e., pay for performance.  Normally, equity 
options are set to align the interests of shareholders and executives and to retain 
and motivate directors for competitive performance.  Remuneration practices 
cannot achieve this alignment because the board power and equity option’s design 
in executive pay may sometimes be harmful to the company’s long-term 
success.107  Executive directors will use their managerial power to influence the 
board and its members; for example by using the power of promotion and 
awarding independent directors who are executives in another company with non-
executive posts, and/or hiring these executives as members of their remuneration 
committee.  Under this managerial influence, boards and remuneration committees 
 
 103.  Deakin, supra note 16, at 3.  
 104.  Deakin, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 105.  See generally Jay Lorsch, Empowering the Board, HARV. BUS. REV., (Jan-Feb. 1995). 
 106.  PwC, Raising the Bar: The state of executive pay in 2015 (May 28, 2018), http://www. 
pwc.co.uk/services/human-resource-services/insights/raising-the-bar-the-state-of-executive-pay-in-
2015.html [perma.cc/9NNR-XLTD].  
 107.  Janice McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulation Executive Compensation to 
Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interest and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 994 (2004). 
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may show some rent-seeking behaviors in using the explicit influence of capital 
markets and products on executives’ equity holdings and bonuses, in order to 
increase the final rewards of executive directors.  Mechanisms to stop this from 
happening are now considered.  
 
A.  DIRECTOR PRIMACY? 
 
The Director Primacy approach proposes that centralized authority and good 
use of accountability mechanisms, eliminates the need for shareholders to approve 
certain detailed resolutions, since generally they are not able to make informed 
decisions.  Interestingly, other arguments, either from supporters of Director 
Primacy who suggest that the board is reliable in making decisions, or from 
proponents of having employees on the board in order to make executive pay 
fairer, are not overly enthusiastic about the idea of using shareholder voting rights 
to solve executive remuneration problems.  Early in the 1990s Villiers pointed out 
that because of information asymmetry, shareholders face various obstacles if they 
wish to interfere in corporate management,108 such as a lack of information 
concerning comparative groups’ income from remuneration consultants, or 
confusion about the criteria that remuneration committees write into pay reports 
relating pay to performance.  For example, there may be various long-term 
incentive plans with different conditions in a single executive’s pay package, a 
confusing set of conditions for shareholders to comprehend fully.  Bainbridge 
posits that empowering shareholders in the corporate decision-making process 
might disrupt the vesting of authoritative control from the board in their 
companies.109 
Moreover, Sharfman argued that instead of enhancing decision making, 
empowering shareholders will increase errors and lead to “a shift of agency costs 
from management to shareholders that overcomes whatever benefit is received 
from a reduction in management agency costs.”110  Even worse, the more 
successful shareholder activities are, the more damaging those activities are likely 
to be to the economy.111  
From the Director Primacy point of view, some proponents suggest that the 
rapidly growing executive remuneration is not a problem.  According to 
Bainbridge’s understanding of the capital market, investors will not purchase 
stocks from companies which provide executives with excessive remuneration, and 
creditors will not lend money to companies which lack executive director 
accountability.112  Therefore, the cost of issuing stocks will rise for these 
companies while their income falls.  As a result, these companies will become 
 
 108.  Charlotte Villiers, Executive Pay: Beyond Control, 15 LEGAL STUD. 260, 261 (1995). 
 109.  Stephen Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified, 32 REG. CORP. GOV. 42, 46 (2009). 
 110.  Bernard Sharfman, What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment, 37 J. CORP. L. 903, 907 
(2012). 
 111.  Id. at 908. 
 112.  Bainbridge, supra note 109, at 45. 
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more vulnerable to hostile takeovers and management reconstruction,113 which will 
bring more instability to both companies and shareholders.  
The problems of executive remuneration rest on the key point that effective 
corporate governance requires the decision-making authority to be vested in a 
small, discrete central agency, rather than in a large diffuse electorate.114  
Bainbridge is not convinced that the idea of board accountability can be 
sustained.115  He even proposes that, if shareholders realize the cost of getting hold 
of adequate information and the seriousness of unreasonable interference, they will 
keep their distance and refrain from making every decision themselves, leaving 
most issues to the board.116  Thus, we are wondering to what extent we need to 
emphasize the notion of board accountability to promote the efficiency and 
effectiveness of executive remuneration issues.  
Details of the board’s function should be studied before director primacy is 
admitted.  As discussed before, there are three main functions of boards.  The first 
is a monitoring role, which requires them to select, compensate, and make 
decisions about the retention of chief managers while overseeing the process of 
accounting, financial reporting and auditing, to help shareholders with these 
disclosures in order for them to make assessments of the company.117  The second 
function is a protective/restorative role, indicating that the board should assist the 
company in claiming and protecting its resources.  The third function is to 
formulate strategy under the direction of senior managers, in order to serve the 
shareholders in their interests with more information about their responsibilities 
while remaining accountable to these responsibilities.118  Executive remuneration 
design is within the first, monitoring function. Nonetheless, the third function, 
related to the board’s accountability to shareholders, should be also emphasized 
when considering remuneration issues.  
The board can develop its monitoring work in three ways: employing structure 
(different committees, such as remuneration or nomination committees, in one 
boardroom), composition (having expertise on different committees and 
independent directors to ensure unbiased decisions), and practice (concerning how 
to manage the firm to establish the board’s role).119  Research has proven that 
regulation has relatively little to do with the evolution of the board’s structure and 
practice. It is the market and social forces that improve these elements.120  Thus, a 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 47. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–02 (2001).  
 118.  Id. at 802–03. 
 119.  Lynne Dallas, Development in US Boards of Directors and the Multiple Roles of Corporate 
Boards, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 20 (2003). 
 120.  Melvin Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1267 (1999); 
see also Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Norms and the Self-governing 
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2001). 
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more appropriate way for legislation to improve board accountability and the 
monitoring function of the board is from the composition aspect, by inviting more 
independent directors to join the functional committees.  According to 
Langevoort’s analysis, it is the law which should continue to insist, or should insist 
more rigorously, on increasing the independence of boards to solve conflicts 
between the agent and the shareholders.  However, Langevoort also claimed that if 
the law becomes too aggressive it will ruin the social dynamic of the board and 
result in a less effective working group.121  Having more independent directors on 
executive committees will not have much influence on executive pay design; this is 
explained as follows. 
Delegation of various powers to the committees of boards does not function 
well. Mitchell concluded that the boards’ problems have existed from the very 
beginning, since the time boards were created to solve agency problems.122  The 
board was designed to fulfill a monitoring function with periodic intervention by 
experts as a means of allowing outsiders, i.e., independent directors, to monitor 
aspects such as nomination, compensation, and auditing.  However, the board has 
developed primarily to shield executive managers from liabilities,123 since there is 
only a direct norm from legislation to indicate what is right and what is possible in 
practical activities.124  As lawyers are usually the ones who interpret law to the 
companies, the directors’ understanding of legislative norms is second- or even 
third-hand,125 not to mention the fact that lawyers may sometimes deliver 
information after being influenced by executives. 
However, the companies that failed during the 2007-09 financial crisis, despite 
being criticized for having inadequate governance, did have independent boards, 
separate positions of chair and CEO, and enough defense against hostile 
takeovers.126  If legislation remains deficient in regulating the board practices, 
shareholder empowerment may constitute an appropriate remedy in a corporate 
governance context.  Although scholars such as Bainbridge and Sharfman favor 
directors running corporations and minimizing shareholder intervention, Director 
Primacy may not be the most appropriate approach when dealing with executive 
remuneration issues. Bebchuk and Fried explained how executives and board 
members could benefit each other through remuneration practice.127  Without 
intervention or regulation, the independence of boards and remuneration 
committees cannot be trusted while they are making remuneration policies and 
reports.  
121.  Langevoort, supra note 117, at 8. 
122.  L. E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, GWU LEGAL Studies Research Paper No. 159, 6–7
(2005). 
123.  Id.
124.  Langevoort, supra note 117, at 11.
125.  Id.
126.  Cheffins, supra note 15, at 6.
127.  LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSIE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
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From the arguments above, two main findings can be concluded: (1) Director 
Primacy is not an ideal method to handle executive remuneration issues.  
Employing more independent directors to improve board accountability is not 
adequate to promote a more effective excursive remuneration mechanism; and (2) 
there should be other ways to improve the board accountability within its 
monitoring and strategic functions.  Shareholder empowerment through the say on 
pay has an indirect influence on pay practice, but it is the remuneration committee 
and the board who have the most direct impact on pay.  Hence, how should the 
board and the board members be guided to improve their accountability? 
 
B.  PRACTICE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY? 
 
Guidelines, principles and various codes of conduct have been created for 
directors and remuneration committees to ensure their function in remuneration 
design and implementation.  However, as Cullen argued, the traditional and 
nondescript language characteristics of these codes and guidelines rely to a large 
extent on executives and other directors working towards the overarching goal of 
shareholder value by using terms such as “structure,” “performance objectives,” 
and “disclosures.”128  However, these are general requirements, without providing 
explicit requirements.  
In fact, the GC100 and Investor Group guidance, published in 2013 and 
amended in 2014,129 shows that guidelines from institutional shareholders are 
sometimes not as general as this.  They are enriched by detailed requirements, 
regulating the aims of remuneration committees in designing executive pay, the 
design of various financial incentives criteria and reporting structures, and even 
how the committee will communicate with shareholders if shareholders have 
concerns about the pay policy.  Nevertheless, guidelines cannot guarantee full 
compliance, not to mention following the best practice of remuneration design.  
However, the GC100 principles made a good start in improving guidelines from 
shareholders and suggesting ways to promote the accountability of remuneration 
committees.  
Remuneration committees do not need to have expert knowledge about how to 
design pay.  Instead, they need to negotiate with remuneration consultants and 
make decisions by using informed judgment.  As Keay noted, with shareholders 
having more power to influence remuneration policy, the board, especially the 
remuneration committee, must increase their accountability as they are required to 
justify their decisions.130  The IoD, whose members are directors from various 
business sectors and even CEOs from large organizations, provides a detailed 
 
 128.  JAY CULLEN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKET, 202 (Edward 
Elgar, 2014).  
 129.  GC100 and Investor Group, Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance 2016, 
http://uk.practicallaw.com/groups/uk-gc100-investor-group [perma.cc/E8E9-FEZV]. 
 130.  ANDREW KEAY, BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 230 (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2015).  
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introduction to the regular work of remuneration committees in setting pay 
policy.131  
First, good knowledge of running the business is critical to ensure that 
compensation is set at an accurate level in relation to basic salary in comparison 
with peer companies.  Second, they need to think of financial factors and markets, 
which will help them with setting pay for performance criteria associated with 
shareholder returns, including annual bonuses and incentive plans.  Third, the 
company’s culture must be taken into account, since remuneration should reflect 
the organization’s values and culture.  The remuneration committee members, 
especially the independent directors, need to recognize the company’s values 
related to successful performance, and avoid cutting bonuses and risking the 
company’s competitiveness.  At this stage, questions may logically be raised about 
how these considerations by the board and remuneration committee may be 
effectively enforced in practice. Detailed solutions to this question will be 
discussed as follows.   
 
i.  The Power of the Advisory Vote 
 
Governments tend to provide shareholders with a say on pay to intervene in 
remuneration practice by improving board and remuneration committee 
accountability.  Under the principles produced by NAPF and other institutional 
investors in relation to remuneration reports, there is a full explanation of the pay 
plan, a deeper analysis of company performance and a well-debated decision based 
on a broader comparison with peer companies, which will help to build trust 
between investors and remuneration committees.132 
However, only in some circumstances the remuneration committee respond to 
a negative vote result.  A few cases show voting alone may affect the remuneration 
outcome.133  Nonetheless, institutional shareholders should show and have already 
shown interest in seeing remuneration committees increase their authority while 
negotiating pay, and improve their will to undertake difficult tasks to punish 
underperformance among executives.134  
The Burberry case in 2014 and the BG Group case in 2015 is a key example to 
investigate the remuneration committee accountability mechanisms’ effectiveness.  
The Burberry remuneration committee provided their CEO with £28 million for his 
first year’s compensation, which precipitated a revolt from the shareholders, with 
52% voting against the proposal.  At the time this was the highest veto percentage 
 
 131.  IoD, The Remuneration Committee Role, http://www.iod.com/guidance/briefings/cgbis-the-
role-of-the-remuneration-committee [perma.cc/5CJ7-NDXW]. 
 132.  NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 3.  
 133.  Sheehan, supra note 91. 
 134.  NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 3. 
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in UK history.135  On the other hand, the board of BG Group voluntarily gave up their 
£25 million pay deal for the new CEO after shareholders showed strong disapproval 
before the resolution day.136  At Burberry, the “golden hello,” worth £7.5m in shares 
for the new CEO, already received a veto from 18% of their shareholders’ in 2014.137  
These concerns were not unreasonable: the new CEO, Christopher Bailey, a designer 
who had previously held the position of Burberry’s chief creative officer, was a new, 
unexperienced incoming CEO.  In 2015, a big fall in retail sales further caused the 
company’s share price to fall by 4%, slashing the board’s pay decision and Mr. 
Bailey’s high bonus, golden hello, and incentive stock pay.138 
After the strong veto for the 2014 CEO remuneration proposal, the board provided 
a new pay policy in the following year.139  With 92.3% of shareholders voting yes, the 
revised pay policy in 2015 meant a reduction in Mr. Bailey’s income to £7.9m.140  This 
high level of shareholder satisfaction was due to the board’s efforts in discussing 
executive pay plans with the majority of their fifty biggest investors after the previous 
year’s revolt.141  However, there were other problems with Burberry’s executive 
remuneration policy, such as several inexplicable vested equity options in Bailey’s pay 
structure that were set before he became CEO.  The  key lesson here is regulation can 
be used to improve the board’s accountability. Remuneration committees and boards 
should always show a willingness to facilitate and enhance communication with 
shareholders on remuneration issues. 
The case of the BG Group is another  good example of conversing with 
investors before a vote on pay policy to avoid public embarrassment.  
Transparency in executive pay is not only about putting cold statistics in front of 
the shareholders at the annual meeting, which may cause misunderstanding 
between the board and shareholders.  A process of negotiating and exchange of 
opinions will improve the board’s accountability and enable a transparent 
executive remuneration process. 
 
 135.  Zoe Wood, Burberry shareholders revolt over Christopher Bailey’s pay package, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 11, 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/11/burberry-shareholders-
revolt-christian-bailey-pay-package [perma.cc/2L5N-ZFB3].  
 136.  Sean Farrell, BG Group shareholders rebel against Helge Lund pay deal, THE GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 5, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/05/bg-group-shareholders-rebel-again 
st-helge-lund-pay-deal [perma.cc/VE3M-J22F]. 
 137.  Andrew Tritman, New Burberry CEO Christopher Bailey Handed £7.5m Golden Hello, 
TELEGRAPH (May 15, 2014) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/ 
10832465/New-Burberry-CEO-Christopher-Bailey-handed-7.5m-golden-hello.html [perma.cc/K5CK-
NVVN]. 
 138.  Andrew Roberts, Burberry to Slash CEO Bailey’s Pay Amid Chinese Sales Slump, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 15, 2015) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-15/burber 
ry-to-slash-ceo-bailey-s-pay-amid-chinese-sales-slump [perma.cc/72X5-RR6S].  
 139.  Shane Hickey, Burberry Investors Approve Chief Executive’s Pay, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 
2015) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/16/burberry-christopher-bailey-investors-appro 
ve-pay [perma.cc/2P97-4PLQ].  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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The reform of executive remuneration design carried out in the UK in 2013 
separates companies’ pay implementation reports from their future remuneration 
policies.  If a majority of the shareholders rejects the previous year’s pay 
implementation report, the board and remuneration committee should present a 
new pay policy in the next year’s annual meeting, for shareholders to vote on; this 
vote is binding.  This regulation is valuable to corporate governance since it helps 
to increase the engagement of shareholders in policymaking and urges boards to 
enhance their communication with investors, especially institutional investors, 
thereby improving board accountability.  The process of how a board might carry 
out a major review of compensation policy in practice may be illustrated in the 
following form142: 
 
 
Source: Sheehan “The Regulation of Executive Compensation” p.90 
 
 
 142.  Sheehan, supra note 91, at 90. 
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Remuneration committees should engage in a regular review of executive pay 
implementation reports, and major reviews of any new remuneration policy.  As 
shown above, after a failure to pass the shareholders’ advisory vote on a 
remuneration report, the remuneration committee will examine the terms of the 
previous policy, collect data from a wider perspective and re-value the equity 
holdings of executives to provide a new calculation of the executive rewards.  
More importantly, they will increase the pre-voting negotiation opportunities with 
shareholders in case this policy also faces a revolt, because the previously rejected 
remuneration report may have made a bad impression on investors.  The UK 
Corporate Governance Code requires that “the chairman of the board should 
ensure that the committee chairman maintains contact as required with its principal 
shareholder about remuneration.”143  The voting procedure would not be the only 
opportunity for shareholders to express their opinion on executive pay policy; 
negotiations before or after shareholder voting on pay could also enhance board 
accountability. 
How to balance the needs of shareholders and executive managers is always a 
central question for the board. In the current legislation environment, the board can 
use various regulations as good opportunities to communicate with shareholders 
and managers.  The importance of dialogue between the board and executive 
directors about their pay will be discussed in the following section.  
 
ii.  Independence and Negotiation with Executives 
 
Regulatory measures are unlikely to have a direct influence on board 
independence.  The independence of the board is influenced by the relationship 
between non-executives and executive directors.  Although personal factors will 
have a good deal of impact on the remuneration committee’s judgment, 
independence can still be built upon these non-executives’ analysis of the 
executives’ behavior, and the non-executives’ pursuit of decisions which may 
benefit both the company and the executives144  However, board accountability 
alone may not be sufficient for developing a sound executive remuneration 
mechanism, as “the directors on remuneration committees also need to be 
competent.”145  Under most circumstances, executive remuneration policy is 
primarily the outcome of negotiations between boards and their executive 
managers, or managers-to-be.146  Before negotiating with shareholders as described 
above, the pay policy will already have been drawn up under the guidance of 
managers.  Thus, how to start and maintain the dialogue with managers in order to 
arrive at a rational pay policy is very important for boards and remuneration 
committees.  
 
 143.  FRC, supra note 6, D.2 Procedure, Supporting Principles. 
 144.  Sheehan, supra note 91, at 65. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Executive Pay: Neither Rigged Nor Fair, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 2016, at 20. 
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The Yahoo case from 2016 is helpful to explain how this negotiation can 
occur in practice.  In 2012, soon after Marissa Mayer, the former vice-president of 
Google, was hired as Yahoo’s CEO, she was approached by another Google 
president, Henrique de Castro.147  Ms. Mayer told the board of Yahoo that she was 
negotiating with a talented person who would fit the position of COO (chief 
operating officer) perfectly, but she needed an attractive pay package in order to 
negotiate.148  However, the board members of Yahoo had little knowledge of the 
candidate because Ms. Mayer did not disclose his identity.149  The new CEO 
provided Yahoo’s remuneration committee with a pay plan for the new COO 
herself.  In a meeting lasting half an hour one day later the committee agreed to 
this pay plan,150 but stipulated that if any material change was made to the plan, 
only the committee had the authority to approve it.151  After this meeting, the 
Yahoo board suspected that Mr. de Castro was the person with whom their CEO 
was negotiating.152  One month later, Mr. de Castro was hired as the new COO at 
Yahoo. Many changes had been made to his pay plan without the consent of the 
remuneration committee, but the remuneration committee did not take any 
action.153  After the termination of Mr. de Castro at Yahoo due to 
underperformance in 2014, he took his severance pay, valued at nearly $60 million 
with $40 million of this in cash.154  Nonetheless, the equity options he chose to 
exercise before his departure were only worth $51 million at the time he left the 
company.155  
It is no longer shocking to see underperforming executives walk away with 
huge amounts of money after they have resigned or been terminated.  However, it 
is shocking that legislation emphasizes independence of boards and remuneration 
committees, but it remains so deficient in practice.  Perhaps Yahoo was just an 
extreme case where the board ignored the negotiation process, but it does raise 
questions about why big companies like Yahoo are so eager to attract directors on 
big salaries.  One of the reasons why executives may receive unreasonably high 
levels of pay is due to the labor market for senior managers.  First, executive 
managers have a general idea themselves about what level of pay they can expect 
based on comparison with their peers working in the same industry.  Second, the 
pool of talented and skilled candidates from which the company could hire and 
 
 147.  Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 761 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 762. 
 150.  Id. at 762. 
 151.  Id. at 762. 
 152.  Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 762 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 153.  Id. at 763. 
 154.  Jim Edwards, Yahoo’s COO Walks Out with $20 Million Stock Bonus Plus $40 Million for 
just 15 Month’s Work, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/yahoo-coo-
enrique-de-castro-has-stock-bonus-pay-package-2014-1 [perma.cc/T4X3-3BQY]. 
 155.  Joseph Bachelder, Hiring and Firing a Key Executive at Yahoo, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 22, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/22/hiring-and-
firing-a-key-executive-at-yahoo/ [perma.cc/6RDD-XYKV]. 
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choose within one industry is very small, particularly for senior management 
positions in public companies.  Company are under huge pressure to offer 
attractive pay packages to attract new talent while retaining existing employees.  
Thus, another issue that the board and remuneration committee need to consider is 
“peer group pay analysis” from remuneration consultants.  
On the subject of remuneration consultants, it is their duty to provide market data 
from peer group companies.  There is no exclusive requirement for the accuracy of 
their market advice.  However, these consultants should provide opinions to the 
remuneration committee fairly and responsibly in terms of their independence and 
care.156  The UK is a good example of coordinating consultants’ services, creating a 
remuneration consulting group in 2009 and producing a Code of Conduct in 2011.  
Revised in 2014, this Code of Conduct aims at clarifying the role of remuneration 
consultants in providing information, analysis, and advice on the level and structure of 
executive pay, ensuring they are making the most informed decisions according to an 
organization’s strategy, financial situation, and pay philosophy.157  
With general regulations in the Anglo-American system paying too much 
attention to conflicts of interest between consultants and companies,158 other 
practical concerns should also be observed.  These concerns may include setting 
standards for selecting comparative peer groups, the selection of equity incentive 
measures, and benchmarking for bonuses.  
Further, with current regulations and rules already defined in terms of the 
remuneration consultant’s independent role in remuneration design,159 a future 
regulatory framework to solve the concerns above could easily be provided based 
on this independence. 
 
C. SUGGESTIONS 
 
From the above, there are three concerns in relation to board accountability 
and remuneration committees.  First, with legislative requirements for the 
transparency of pay increasing over the years, boards and remuneration 
committees must ensure that various data are easy to understand without the risk of 
leaving investors in confusion.  Second, the shortcomings of pay policy design are 
still obvious.  Pay for underperformance and even for failure still exists in various 
industries.  Third, with the help of legislation, boards and remuneration committees 
should learn how to negotiate better with both shareholders and directors with 
regard to pay design. 
 
 156.  Sheehan, supra note 91, at 75. 
 157.  Voluntary Code of Conduct in Relation to Executive Remuneration Consulting in the UK, 
(Jan. 2014), http://www.remunerationconsultantsgroup.com [https://perma.cc/5FQJ-TCYE].  
 158.  Brian Cadman, Mary Carter & Stephen Hillegeist, The Incentives of Compensation 
Consultants and CEO Pay, 49 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 263, 265 (2010); see also Kevin Murphy & Tatiana 
Sandino, Executive Pay and Independent Compensation Consultants, 49 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 247, 
249–50 (2010). 
 159.  Sheehan supra note 91, at 76. 
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i. Reporting  
 
With the fraction of equity incentives increasing significantly in executives’ 
total pay and structure, the complexity of the pay policy always leaves 
shareholders confused, and means they have to rely heavily on advisory groups for 
their voting decisions.  This phenomenon is not only inconvenient for the 
shareholders, but also allowed directors to make the presumption that shareholders 
are voting irresponsibly, such as in the JP Morgan case.160  A sound pay plan or 
pay report should ensure that shareholders have sufficient information to vote 
upon, knowing what to expect in the following year and avoiding the risk of 
unexpected outcomes in future pay reports.161  In the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, it is the board’s responsibility to present “fair, balanced and understandable” 
reports to shareholders and other stakeholders.162  However, in practice the 
guidelines from NAPF et al. suggest although many listed companies have long-
term incentive plans and deferred bonuses designed for their executives, 
shareholders are not able to read and understand the multiple equity options and 
bonus schemes.163  There are usually several financial incentives in the 
remuneration policy and report, with various different performance conditions set 
for them. 
For an example, Tesco’s 2015 remuneration report had several limitations.  
First, in its single total figure for each executive director’s remuneration, though it 
provides every element of pay clearly in a table, the report showed no data on how 
many shares each executive was granted.164  Shareholders need to have a general 
view of the quantities of shares that may be held by executives, together with their 
salaries, bonuses, and other figures.  This then provides an overall picture.  Second, 
in the “loss of company” section (also called the “loss of office”), there is no form 
to explain how much the company is going to pay its departing executives in total, 
or any explanation of why its former CEO would be granted various payments and 
benefits.165  Compared to the 2013-2014 remuneration report which received only 
a 1.38% revolt from its shareholders, this 2014-2015 implementation report led 
nearly 19% of the shareholders to vote negatively.166  Besides shareholders’ 
dissatisfaction about Tesco’s share price drop during 2014 and 2015, part of the 
 
 160.  Simon Bowers, JP Morgan Takes Advice from Firm That Its Chief Attacked, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/15/jp-morgan-advice-jamie-dimon-
voting [perma.cc/T77J-DJY6].   
 161.  GC100 and Investor Group, supra note 129, at 5. 
 162.  FRC, supra note 6, Section C, Accountability, C.1 Main Principle, “The board should present 
a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s position and prospects.” 
 163.  NAPF et al., supra note 49, at 4. 
 164.  Tesco PLC Annual Report and Financial Statements 2015, TESCO, https://www.tesco 
plc.com [perma.cc/5XUN-R8Z5].  
 165.  Id. at 55. 
 166.  Sarah Butler, Tesco Faces Shareholder Unrest over Executive Pay, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/26/tesco-sales-drop-13-but-outperform-market-
expectations [perma.cc/HJ82-BMZB]. 
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reason for this revolt was that the implementation report was not able to persuade 
the shareholders.167  Deficiencies in remuneration reports have not only caused 
confusion and dissatisfaction among investors, but have also led to concerns on the 
part of boards about future remuneration policy making and the reputation of the 
company.  Apart from a regulatory procedure for remuneration practice, it would 
be better if there were some requirements, or at least guidelines, from the 
government about how to draft remuneration reports.  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code is a good example.  In section D 
Remuneration, a subsection (D.3 Conciseness) would be useful, offering guidance 
on how the board and remuneration committee should explain the pay policy.  This 
subsection would help  shareholders to make more informed decisions when they 
vote.  
 
i. Flexibility 
 
In the cases of Morrisons and Tesco, in which now-departed CEOs were 
highly paid for underperformance, the remuneration committee should also have 
paid attention to the flexibility of the pay policy design.  Boards need to ensure that 
their pay policy arranges various elements of remuneration, subject to appropriate 
adjustments at the discretion of the remuneration committee.168  Although 
shareholders have an advisory vote on the compensation implementation report, 
this power does not enable them to stop pay for failure.  In 2016, cases from BP, 
JPMorgan, Citibank and Volkswagen again emphasized the importance of the 
implementation of remuneration design in practice.  For example, BP’s CEO Bob 
Dudley had his pay increased by 20% in 2016 for his performance in 2015, despite 
the fact that BP experienced the worst loss in the oil industry in 2015.169  Even 
though BP made a loss of $5.2 billion in 2015, the main rise in his remuneration 
was from his pension savings, which increased due to a change in retirement 
benefits, as well as his annual bonus which increased by 40% according to the 
bonus target set by his remuneration policy.170  
To prevent pay for failure, shareholders should have a binding vote on pay for 
executives who leave the company in the next fiscal year after the AGM.  It is 
creative and wise of the UK 2013 remuneration reform to separate the power of the 
shareholder say on pay into separate aspects of the remuneration policy and the 
remuneration implementation report.  However, the implementation of the policy 
for executives departing because of poor performance and losses to the company 
may require additional attention.  
The French government also plans to propose a similarly flexible method of 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  GC100 and Investor Group, supra note 129, at 5.  
 169.  Kiran Stacey, Ed Crooks & Stephen Foley, BP Revives Investor Fury on Executive Pay, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/be44d458-024a-11e6-99cb-83242733f755 [perma. 
cc/AY9Y-97BR].  
 170.  Id. 
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shareholder voting, where recent public outrage towards the motor giant Renault’s 
ignorance of their shareholders’ revolt over the compensation of the company’s 
CEO Carlos Ghosn reached the French government.  On June 10, 2016, the French 
National Assembly passed the Minister’s measure providing a stricter and more 
binding shareholders’ say on pay for the remuneration of chief executives in public 
companies.171  The reason why the French government reacted so quickly and 
decisively to the Renault situation was partly because the French state owns a 
considerable shareholding (20%) in this company, and the state voted no to the 
CEO’s pay.172  It may seem overly restrictive for the French government to 
propose new legislation against public companies’ ignorance of shareholder power 
over such a short term.  However, this reflects a significant corporate governance 
issue.  The intrinsic reason here was the lack of accountability of the board, 
disregarding 54% of the shareholders who exercised their veto over the pay deal.173  
The French government proposed to move further on shareholders’ say on pay than 
the UK reform, requiring that shareholders have the power to vote on remuneration 
implementation reports every year, on a binding basis.174  Surprisingly, this reform 
was supported by French institutions and proxy groups, who rejected the claim that 
the legislation provides excessive power to the shareholders.175  It seems that the 
current excessive pay for failure has caused serious concerns. 
The importance of a remuneration policy rests on its influence on the 
remuneration set in the future, and the issue of how to align pay with performance. 
On one hand, this is probably the reason why shareholders are given voting powers 
on this issue, giving them the feeling that they are empowered to make decisions 
for the company. On the other hand, however, implementation reports must not be 
underestimated. From a practical point of view, the implementation report decides 
the final scale of the remuneration of executives. Shareholders will not be satisfied 
with a merely advisory vote on this report, and it is crucially important from the 
point of view of board accountability that the board feels obliged to hear the 
shareholders’ voice in implementing directors’ pay, especially for departing 
executives who been involved in a loss to the company. Although it is difficult for 
remuneration committees and boards to design the variable factors in executive 
pay every year, this French proposal confirms the direction for legislation in other 
countries, suggesting a way to stop pay for underperformance.  
The revised section 430 (2B) of the UK Companies Act 2006, introduced in 
the 2016 reform, provides: 
 
 171.  Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, French Shareholders Win Say on Executive Pay, Legislation 
follows dispute pitting Renault against shareholders, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 2016. 
 172.  Lucy P Marcus, Why the Revolt Against Executive Pay Is Not Going Away, THE GUARDIAN, 
May 22, 2016; see also Peter Campbell & Michael Stothard, French Government Leads Shareholder 
Revolt against Renault, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016.  
 173.  Id. 
 174.  French Assemblée Nationale, Amendment No. 14 to the French Commercial Code, http:// 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/3757/AN/14.asp [perma.cc/8REF-35VQ]. 
 175.  Campbell & Stothard, supra note 172. 
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If a person ceases to be a director of a quoted company, the 
company must ensure that the following information is made 
available on the website on which its annual accounts and reports are 
made available – (a) the name of the person concerned, (b) 
particulars of any remuneration payment (within the meaning of 
Chapter 4A of Part 10) made or to be made to the person after 
ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was 
calculated, and (c) particulars of any payment for loss of office 
(within the meaning of that Chapter) made or to be made to the 
person, including its amount and how it was calculated. 
 
According to this provision, public companies should post an online statement 
about any director leaving office, including how to calculate this director’s 
remuneration according to her pre-agreed pay policy before the loss of office.  This 
transparency requirement, together with other requirements in relation to loss of 
office payments from section 226, is quite helpful for shareholders to obtain 
general information about the departing director.  However, a symbolic non-
binding vote does not provide shareholders with enough power to stop pay for 
failure.   
 
iii. Negotiation and Responsibility 
 
From the shareholders’ perspective, as summarized above, the way that the 
UK reform separates the power of the shareholders’ say on pay should be noted by 
other legislative regimes and governments.  The binding vote on the future 
remuneration policy did have some impact on the rapidly increasing trend of 
executive pay.  However, due to different political, economic, and cultural 
backgrounds, a binding say on pay might not be suitable for every country—for 
example Germany, which already has strong trade union representation on the 
supervisory boards of large companies to monitor directors and their pay.  
The design of the UK advisory vote on remuneration implementation reports 
escalates communication between shareholders and enhances board accountability 
towards shareholders.  As mentioned above, if boards and remuneration 
committees in the UK do not wish to provide another remuneration policy within a 
three-year period, they must have discussions with shareholders, especially large 
institutional shareholders, before resolution, to gain a general idea of how they will 
vote on the implementation report.  This positive communication between boards 
and shareholders may improve the quality of shareholder engagement and the 
efficiency of remuneration reporting.  An efficient legislative direction may be 
more effective than a clean-cut requirement in the corporate governance code that 
lacks enforcement measures, such as “the chairman of the board should ensure that 
the committee chairman maintains contact as required with its principal 
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shareholder about remuneration.”176  The reason why several large UK companies 
upset their shareholders in relation to their implementation report for executive 
remuneration was because the directors were leaving their companies and their 
future pay policies were not due to be revised in the following fiscal year.  This is 
also another reason for introducing a binding say on pay for departing managers as 
mentioned above, in order to stop pay for failure.  
Learning from the Yahoo case and from other empirical evidence about board 
independence from CEOs and other executive managers, improvements could be 
made to the negotiations between boards and executive directors.  Negotiations 
between boards and managers may be less complicated compared with those 
between boards and shareholders.  However, it is not an easy job for boards and 
their remuneration committees to maintain absolute independence during these 
negotiations.  According to the managerial power approach, Bebchuk et al. suggest 
that executive managers are able to increase their own remuneration by using their 
considerable power over boards and other independent directors on the 
remuneration committee.  Especially when companies are running smoothly, non-
executive directors usually choose to cooperate with management teams within 
their social networks.177  Even though corporate government codes in many 
jurisdictions require non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, it is 
almost impossible for remuneration committees to obtain independence from 
executive directors.  Moreover, a study collecting data from FTSE 350 companies 
between 1996 and 2005 has shown that the composition of remuneration 
committees has no statistical impact on the level of executive pay; the 
independence of the remuneration committee cannot guarantee that executive 
remuneration will remain at a reasonable level.178 
We think it is necessary and significant to emphasize the responsibility of the 
leaders, including the chairman of the board and the head of the remuneration 
committee.  Legislation could provide for appraisal schemes for every director of a 
remuneration committee in order to evaluate their performance. 
 
iv. Principles 
 
Suggestions for legislation regulating remuneration committees and boards 
may be summarized as follows: 
1.  To provide guidelines for corporate governance, encouraging 
companies to provide concise remuneration reports to increase the efficiency 
of shareholder voting and the boards’ work; 
2.  To make the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration report for 
departing executive managers binding, in order to prevent pay for failure; 
 
 176.  FRC, supra note 6, Section D.2: Procedure.   
 177.  Lucian Bebchuk, Jessie Fried & David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 768 (2002). 
 178.  Ian Gregory-Smith, Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence, 74 
OXFORD BULLITIN OF ECON. & STAT. 510, 522 (2012). 
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3.  To pursue the responsibility of the board and its remuneration 
committee for any lack of negotiation during the creation of the 
remuneration policy and report.  
III. REMUNERATION DESIGN: HOW TO IMPROVE  
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
 
“A variety of legal persons are targeted by the regulation: listed companies, 
boards of directors, remuneration committees, individual executives/directors, 
institutional investors and shareholders.”179  The law only gives guidelines for 
progress which executive managers and the board can easily hide behind.  Thus, 
we should pay special attention to remuneration policy design.  
The International Corporate Governance Network suggests that there should 
be three factors to test executive remuneration practice: transparency, 
accountability, and pay for performance.  Transparency means that shareholders 
and the public are able to obtain detailed information and monitoring rights with 
regard to the remuneration of executive directors, a matter discussed in the first 
section in this article.  The accountability of the board and remuneration committee 
to shareholders in terms of the practice of executive compensation, which should 
be improved, was analyzed in the second section.  However, these factors are both 
intended to achieve the third goal, which is pay for performance.  
Pay for performance is the ultimate goal of executive remuneration practices 
under various theories that have been proposed to explain remuneration.  The 
following section will present a brief analysis of how to link pay with performance 
in practice, and summarize the difficulties of regulating pay for performance from 
a legislative perspective.  
 
A. SETTING FOR PERFORMANCE 
 
Normally, most executive pay policies are set on an ex ante basis, where the 
level and structure of directors’ compensation packages are influenced by business 
conditions and the size of companies.  Executive remuneration levels and company 
performance may be conditional on the companies’ investment opportunities.180  
Because directors’ actions are seldom observable to shareholders, shareholders 
have to make investments or offer to hire executive directors based on measures 
they can observe, aligned to firm performance.  Normally, because the ability to 
observe executives’ actions is decreasing, incentive compensation, which indicates 
 
 179.  Sheehan, supra note 45, at 33. 
 180.  Clifford Smith & Ross Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, 
Dividend and Compensation Policies, 32 J. OF FIN. ECON. 263, 280–81 (1992). 
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market performance, is increasing.181  Developing from these empirical 
investigations, Baber et al. found that shareholders’ investments are associated 
with the company’s market-based performance, rather than its accounting-based 
performance, while the executive directors’ stock incentive compensation is a 
crucial consideration in the investors’ judgments.182  Because shareholders invest 
in the firm based on information about its managers’ stock income, there may be 
situations where executives increase their pay level or manipulate share prices to 
attract investment opportunities.  Baber et al. inferred from their research that the 
influence of market-based performance factors on shareholders’ investment will 
encourage cynical executive action to attract shareholder interest.183 
Interference from legislation and government, as mentioned above, may 
provide several methods to solve or at least mitigate such situations.  If there is 
little legislative intervention endowing shareholders with voting rights and 
regulating an independent remuneration committee, there may be misalignments 
between executive compensation and performance.  Klapper and Love engaged in 
a study of 495 public companies from various countries across twenty-five 
emerging markets and eighteen sectors, with the purpose of investigating the 
relationship between country-level shareholder rights and national judicial 
efficiency.  The researchers found that companies in countries with weak legal 
systems normally have lower governance rankings in the international data, and 
under those weak legislative situations a company’s good performance is more 
positively correlated with better market-based and accounting performance.184  
With weak regulations and poor governance, directors’ managerial power can 
easily influence pay policy, leading to a misalignment of pay and performance. 
However, there is little guidance from legislation about how to evaluate 
remuneration policy design.  Regulations about managers’ compensation should 
also consider the influence of both market-based performance and accounting-
based performance standards for executive remuneration policy.  Market-based 
performance is measured against the company’s stock market return, while 
accounting-based performance concerns the accounting return on the company’s 
equities.  Executives’ income is explicitly tied to stock-price performance through 
performance-related changes according to the value of their stockholdings, 
restricted stock options, and long-term stock options.  Pay performance 
sensitivities represent the executives’ share of the value that they have created.  
When shareholders’ wealth increases by $1, the value of executives’ restricted and 
unrestricted stockholdings will increase in line with  executives’ ownership of their 
 
 181.  Jennifer Gaver & Kenneth Gaver, Additional Evidence on the Association Between the 
Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies, 16 J. OF 
ACCT. & ECON. 125, 155 (1993). 
 182.  William Baber, Surya Janakiraman & Sok-Hyon Kang, Investment Opportunities and the 
Structure of Executive Compensation, 21 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 297, 315 (1996). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Leora Klapper & Inessa Love, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance 
in Emerging Markets, 10 J. OF CORP. FIN. 703, 723 (2004). 
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company’s shares185  Additionally, these two performance standards each have an 
impact on the other.  Executive income is indirectly tied to stock-price 
performance through accounting-based bonuses, which reflects the correlation 
between accounting returns and stock-price performance, and also through annual 
adjustments of salary levels and target bonuses.186 
Earlier studies have confirmed theoretical assumptions that there is a linear 
relationship between executive compensation and performance from market and 
accounting perspectives.187  In Lambert and Larcker’s comparative research, they 
propose that cash remuneration exhibits a stronger positive time-series relation 
with accounting-based performance, while market-based performance only has a 
modest time-series influence on cash pay.188  They also suggest that companies that 
are developing quickly tend to place more emphasis on executives’ market-based 
performance than on their accounting-based performance.189  
Apart from executive directors’ management behavior, other uncontrollable 
factors could also decrease the relative weight that these two performance factors 
have on executive compensation levels.190  These factors are illustrated under two 
perspectives: (1) under the force of the stock market, calculating pay-performance 
sensitivities from the executives’ option holdings aspect is more difficult than for 
stock holdings, since option values do not change dollar-for-dollar with changes in 
share prices;191 and (2) financial incentives in pay are created depending on various 
factors, including the executive’s portfolio and the company’s future risk 
preference.192  Argarwal and Samwich suggest that the level of corporate risk, 
which is also known as the firm return variance, is an important determinant of the 
level of remuneration for executives, and it is “robust” across the other measures of 
firm risk.193  According to these financial studies, failure to allocate company risk 
to compensation incentives will underestimate the real pay for performance 
relation.194  
Even with regulations providing shareholders with voting rights and requiring 
the independence of boards and remuneration committees, previous factors such as 
 
 185.  KEVIN MURPHY, Executive Compensation: Where we are and how we got there, in 
HANDBOOK OF ECON. & FIN., G. 25 (Constantinides ed., 2013). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 89–90 (1979); 
Rajiv Banker & Srikant Datar, Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Accounting Signals, 27 
J. ACCT. RES. 21, 34–35 (1989). 
 188.  Richard Lambert & David Larcker, An Analysis of the Accounting and Market Measures of 
Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts, 25 J. ACCT. RES., Studies on Stewardship Uses of 
Accounting Information 85, 113 (1987). 
 189.  Id. at 114–15. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Murphy, supra note 185, at 37. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Rajesh Aggarwal & Andrew Samwick, Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and 
Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence, 54 THE J. FIN. 1999, 2032 (1999). 
 194.  Paul Gregg, Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, Executive Pay and Performance in the UK, 9 AXA 
Working Paper No. 5, Discussion Paper No. 657, 2010. 
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excessive pay for failures and wrongful incentive design to encourage executives 
to take unreasonable risks can be all explained according to these two 
uncontrollable factors, which are always ignored by regulations.  Therefore, in this 
section these situations will be investigated and various methods that legislation 
can utilize will be discussed.  
B. PAY STRUCTURE 
i. Long-term Equity Option Vesting Period 
 
The most serious problem in relation to the realization of executive directors’ 
equity options, especially with long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), is that there are 
no requirements on the length of the post-exercise period in the current 
legislation.195  Several issues in relation to long-term equity options need special 
attention from remuneration committees.  These issues include a long vesting 
period, usually lasting five to ten years, an exercise point at which the executive 
directors can claim their ownership of the shares, a post-exercise period during 
which the director will hold the shares, and finally a transferability point at which 
they can sell the shares for cash.  Because there currently is no limitation on the 
holding period, under most circumstances executives will use their power to push 
share prices to a high level and sell their shares immediately after the exercise 
point.  This type of managerial behavior, focusing on short-term profits, will 
certainly jeopardize companies’ long-term success and shareholders’ long-term 
interests.  
Equity markets and product markets may sometimes help with pay for 
underperformance.  Under good industrial performance or if the company has 
performed badly on previous occasions, the equity options of executive managers 
will increase dramatically without any effort on their part due to long-term 
incentives, such as improvements in the company’s share prices.196  Peer group 
review is a method that remuneration committee can use to avoid paying 
executives for under-performance.  This type of review includes an evaluation of 
the level and structure of executive pay given by comparative companies in the 
same industry.  This analysis may be carried out by the remuneration committee, 
by remuneration consultants, and sometimes even by the managers.197  The reason 
why the companies and remuneration consultants should pay attention to this 
comparison is that shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, already 
recognize peer group reviews as a general performance measure for long-term 
incentive plans.198  
 
 195.  McClendon, supra note 107. 
 196.  Diago DiMartino, Are CEOs Hiding Behind Long-term Awards? Trend Towards Incentives 
Opens Another Chapter in Compensation Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1, 2003. 
 197.  Sheehan, supra note 91, at 124–25. 
 198.  ABI, Association of British Insurers, 2008, Executive contracts and Severance Guidelines 
from ABI and NAPF, https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2008/02/Executive-contracts-and-
severance-Guidelines-from-ABI-and-NAPF [perma.cc/ASY5-5GKC].  
1 - EXECRENUMERATIONMACROFINAL SL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  10:56 AM 
Summer 2019 EXECUTIVE RENUMERATION 243 
Perhaps long-term incentive plans may work better if corporate governance 
codes, or even legislation such as the Companies Act, were to require that these 
equity options be exercisable at least three to five years after the vesting period.  
This will be particularly relevant for executives who have left companies with their 
work accomplished.  These long-term vested equities prove that they have 
contributed to the companies’ long-term productivity. Even though they are not 
able to claim their money, the companies would normally reward and compensate 
them with other bonuses, short-term incentives, and benefits.  If executives are 
dismissed or resign because of underperformance, companies will probably cancel 
their long-term incentive plans.  
For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that: 
 
for share-based remuneration the remuneration committee 
should consider requiring directors to hold a minimum number of 
shares and to hold shares for a further period after vesting or 
exercise, including for a period after leaving the company, subject to 
the need to finance any costs of acquisition and associated tax 
liabilities.  In normal circumstances, shares granted or other forms of 
deferred remuneration should not vest or be paid, and options should 
not be exercisable, in less than three years. Longer periods may be 
appropriate.  Grants under executive share options and other long-
term incentive schemes should normally be phased in rather than 
awarded in one large block.199  
 
According to Deloitte’s study on the executive remuneration reports of FTSE 
250 companies, 80% of the long term incentive plans of investigated companies 
now incorporate a post-vesting holding period.200  It may be observed that 
Schedule A has provided a good example in encouraging public companies to 
adopt a longer holding period in long-term incentive plans.  This improvement has 
also shown that, under good direction from regulation, it is possible to develop and 
adjust the structure of executive remuneration policy and regulate it through soft 
law.  
Also, if governments feel that this legislation has intervened too heavily in the 
governance issues of public companies, institutional shareholders can strongly 
recommend in their remuneration guidelines that their investee companies should 
provide longer vesting periods in their equity incentives.  
As the next step to promote a longer holding period for exercisable shares, this 
paper proposes regulations to push remuneration committees to provide reasons in 
remuneration policies together with using the expertise of consultants from peer 
group analysis. 
 
 199.  FRC, supra note 6, at 24.  
 200.  Deloitte, Your Guide: Directors’ remuneration in FTSE 250 companies, (Oct. 2018), 
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ii. Short-term incentive options 
 
The HSBC case is worth discussing as it raises several interesting points 
concerning pay policy design.  The HSBC remuneration committee proposed a 
policy to benefit the long-term profits of the company in 2011.  Top executives 
would only be able to sell their equity options after their retirement.201  From the 
remuneration structure discussion above, it is positive that these top executives in 
the banking sectors must maintain their equity holdings for a longer time.  The 
HSBC remuneration committee designed their long-term incentive plan with five 
years as a vesting period, in order to promote the company’s future success. 
This policy has influenced the level of pay of HSBC’s CEO, Stuart Gulliver; 
his pay was £12.5 million in 2011, but his remuneration was £7.4 million, £8 
million and £7.6 million from 2012 to 2014 respectively.202  However, 
shareholders were confused by the criteria suggested by John Thornton, the 
chairman of the remuneration committee at that time, which suggested measuring 
the share awards in a way that was not based on the company’s share returns.203  
Also, in 2015 nearly 23.7% of the HSBC shareholders voted against the CEO’s 
pay report, compared with 16% in 2014 and 11% in 2013 because of some 
misconduct in investing and a sudden increase in Gulliver’s basic salary.204  The 
increase in the shareholder veto in 2014 was due to the newly introduced EU 
executive bonus cap rule, whereby executive bonuses and other financial 
incentives cannot be more than 100% of their salary, or 200% with the 
shareholders’ approval.  Gulliver’s salary increased by 70%, from £2.5m to £4.2m, 
and he complained that “we had a compensation plan here that the shareholders 
liked but sadly because of the EU directive we’ve had to change it. This isn’t 
something we would have wanted to do. … It’s much more complicated.”205 
Thus, although long-term incentives are now the most contentious issue in 
executive pay packages, other elements such as bonus plans and other short-term 
incentives also have an impact on total pay levels and shareholders’ attitudes 
towards pay reports.  
With the use of restricted share options and long-term equity plans increasing 
rapidly since the late 1990s and during the 2000s, managers took “unnecessary and 
excessive” risks to enhance share prices up to 2008, which brought the attention of 
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the public and governments to focus on managers’ compensation.206  In 2010 long-
term incentive options made up 47.8% of the total pay of the U.S. Fortune 500 
companies, compared with 44.7% in 2006; in the UK, FTSE 350 executives 
received their remuneration with long-term incentives comprising 49.6% in 2010 
and 39.7% in 2006.207  As discussed above, measures such as increasing the 
vesting periods for long-term equity plans, recovering deferred bonuses, and 
reducing golden parachutes were already implemented before the financial 
crisis.208  Their role in linking performance and pay, and how to regulate them in 
law, will be analyzed next. 
Short-term incentives, normally annual bonuses and restricted equity options, 
may be granted to executive managers after a conditional period, which is shorter 
compared to long-term incentive options.  These short-term incentive plans are 
more heavily influenced by the company’s business strategy and financial status 
compared with long-term incentive plans, which are mainly designed to promote 
long-term relationships with executives.  Executives tend to sell all of their shares 
after the vesting period, so it is in their own personal interest to boost the share 
prices before selling, or to focus excessively on short-term prices for those 
options while neglecting the long-term performance of the firm.209  
In our opinion, the rules for reporting short-term incentive pay should be 
embedded in the corporate governance code, under the “comply or explain” 
principle.  Under Murphy’s theory, the economic cost of companies granting 
equity options should be emphasized and calculated as if the companies did not 
grant those shares to its managers.  Murphy suggests that, first, remuneration 
committees and boards should calculate their company’s income as if its executive 
managers were not granted short-term share plan.210  After this calculation, 
remuneration committees and boards can include these figures in the company’s 
remuneration report, or even show what the company has spent on granting shares 
to managers instead of selling them to outside investors.  This requirement will 
improve the transparency of pay reporting, and promote the long-term success of 
the company through shareholder engagement and monitoring.  
NAPF’s institutional shareholders alliance principle on executive 
remuneration suggests that there has been too much debate between companies and 
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investors around short-term or medium-term compensation designs.211  They 
suggest that the current average three-year period of equity vesting in executive 
pay may not be the best way to promote long-term success, particularly for the 
largest and most complex companies such as those listed in the FTSE 100.212  
Studies of executive compensation from the financial industry suggest that to stop 
executive managers focusing on short-term profits and gaining excessive pay by 
using strategies such as inflated asset prices, incentive plans should be extended to 
five to ten years, not only for long-term equity plans but also for restricted share 
options.213  
To promote the companies’ long-term success, Bhagat and Romano even 
propose that financial incentives in executive pay should all be changed to 
restricted stock or long-term stock options.214  The condition they suggest for 
financial incentives is that after the vesting period executive directors should wait 
for two to four years after their resignation or their last day in office to sell the 
shares they already owned at the time of their departure.215  
In terms of financial incentive development, short-term incentives may be 
merged gradually with long-term incentive plans, because shareholders prefer to 
invest in companies where executive remuneration is based more on long-term 
share plans.216  However, due to the advantages of short-term options over long-
term incentives, such as attracting new executive managers to join the business and 
paying managers for short-term performance by encouraging long-term 
commitment, investors seem to be more inclined to approve short-term plans.217  
Thus, removing the pay element from the executive remuneration structure may 
not be the best proposal. 
C. FAIR PAY? 
i. Fairness in Regulation 
 
A central question surrounding government regulation  of pay gaps is how far 
the government can intervene in fairness issues.  
Fair pay issues from company law and corporate governance perspectives can 
be categorized according to two factors.  First, how do pay gaps and inequality 
between executive directors and employees in a company influence the lower-level 
employees’ performance and the company’s long-term productivity?  Second, do 
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directors consider  inequality when they are making pay decisions?  If so, under 
what circumstances should regulation towards fairness occur?  
Several studies show increasing dispersion in pay leads to lower productivity, 
less cooperation, and larger threats to turnover.218  Hicks discussed the importance 
of the psychology of workers in 1963, noting “it is also necessary that there should 
not be strong feelings of injustice about the relative treatment of employees since 
these would diminish the efficiency of the team.”219  Additionally, research 
indicates companies will perform better with less dispersion in pay because the 
employees are less resentful towards the executives and more willing to contribute 
to the company.220 
Therefore, a negative correlation can be postulated between higher executive 
and employee compensation, and employee and company performance.  Then, the 
next essential question to arise will be how to address the problem of pay 
inequality. 
Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock studied 122 public companies over a five-year 
period and proposed, first, CEO compensation is correlated positively with the 
lower-level employees’ pay, and second, CEOs are concerned with fairness as well 
as their own self-interest, and while they are negotiating to increase their own 
payment they will also think about their subordinates and, if possible, the 
employees.221  
In August 2015 the U.S. government provided a disclosure requirement on the 
ratio between the pay of regular employees and that of top executives.  A new 
section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act clarified that a public company’s pay policy 
needs to give a record of the ratio of the total CEO remuneration to the median 
total employee compensation, in effort to promote board accountability to 
shareholders in relation to executive compensation practices.222  As noted by the 
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, this rule “provides companies with substantial 
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flexibility in determining the pay ratio, while remaining true to the statutory 
requirements.”223 
From the SEC’s statements, this new provision aims to promote board 
accountability for executive remuneration and flexibility in pay policy design by 
providing shareholders with clear pay ratio information in annual reports, proxy 
statements, and even registration statements. Though it touches on the topic of 
reporting pay ratios in the pay report, this new rule says nearly nothing about 
fairness in pay, or about narrowing the pay gap between CEOs and employees.  
Although think tanks in the U.S. and the UK have both suggested that pay ratios 
should be used to decrease pay gaps and inequality in the work place,224 the new 
section in the Dodd-Frank Act does not seem to draw attention to these issues. 
The rationale behind this disclosure requirement for pay ratios may be found 
in the SEC’s proposal for amendments to Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which requires listed companies to provide a clearer description of the relationship 
between the executive compensation paid to the managers and the shareholders’ 
total share return.  It also requires a description of the relationship between the 
company’s total share return and the share return of comparative peer group 
companies over the preceding five years, chosen by the compensation 
committee.225  This proposed amendment will help shareholders by providing 
detailed remuneration reports with additional information to enable them to vote 
on remuneration issues. 
The U.S. shareholder say on pay amendment stays at the advisory level.  
Requiring a pay ratio to be reported in the proxy statements may provide 
shareholders with a more general view of CEO pay levels.  However, it rarely 
provides ways to decrease pay gaps.  Governments in the UK and the U.S. are still 
focused on attracting investment for their public companies by providing 
shareholders with more detailed information and the power to decide on pay 
policies and reports.  A possible solution may relate to redistribution, tax 
regulation, or it may draw from another corporate governance model, for example 
the German model.  Providing shareholders with the power to veto proposals may 
not be the best way to stop inequities in pay.  
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ii. Having Employees on the Board? 
 
The German corporate governance model certainly does not suit every 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it does provide some useful lessons.  The Volkswagen 
case shows that to reassess executive pay for underperformance, it is not enough to 
have employees on the board.  After the German auto giant’s emissions scandal in 
2016, the management board members’ bonuses were cut by 30%.226  However, 
this reduction in executive pay did not assuage Volkswagon shareholder 
dissatisfaction.227  TCI, an aggressive UK-based activist investor with £993 million 
invested in Volkswagen, published a letter to the company’s management and 
supervisory boards about the shareholders’ requirements for executive 
remuneration reform.228  In the letter, this TCI suggested that the reason why 
managers in Volkswagen could be paid for underperformance was due to their 
efforts to save unnecessary job losses and increase employees’ wages.229  Because 
the company has employees representing the German Labor Union on its 
supervisory board, and because these employee representatives have the power to 
decide how to pay management teams, it becomes crucial and logical for 
executives to devote extra attention to employees’ interests to maintain their 
compensation level.  After an evaluation of Volkswagen’s recent cash-flow and 
payouts, TCI also pointed out that shareholders should have the power to monitor 
executive pay practice by annual voting on the remuneration report and via 
intervention from investors, another  potential route for more effective executive 
pay practice.230  
Besides this letter, governance experts have also expressed concerns about 
having employees on the board.  Their first concern is the accountability of the 
board.  Under German law, half of the supervisory board seats are reserved for 
employees, who are likely to lack professional management knowledge.  This lack 
of expertise may undermine board accountability to shareholders.  Since 2002, the 
chairman of Volkswagen has discussed business issues with the workers’ council 
and agreed a position first, then brought it to the shareholders—unlike the situation 
in the UK, where the chairman arrives at a common position with the shareholders 
firsts and then talks with the board.231  A former Volkswagen executive once said 
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that “the board was really a show.”232  Although there are employee representatives 
on the board, these representatives do not seem to be active in performing their 
monitoring and supervising job as expected.  Current and former employee 
representatives of Volkswagen supervisory board have stated that they knew 
nothing of the company’s emissions cheating and had never discussed engine 
issues with any other director.233  
The second concern comes from the board’s interaction.  To ensure that 
employee representatives are willing to allow a generous pay package, executives 
may place too much emphasis on gaining employees’ favour and support, 
neglecting payback for shareholders and the whole company’s interests.  Tilley 
noted that to regain the public’s trust on executive remuneration, it is necessary to 
ensure that a pay policy is “embedded with a strategy for delivering long-term 
sustainable corporate growth.234  Companies’ long-term interests should be set as 
the main goal of remuneration design and practice, rather than the balance among 
the interests of shareholders, managers and employees.  The employee monitoring 
function aims to improve the independence of the board and the remuneration 
committee.  However, if employee representatives start leaning towards increasing 
managers’ pay for underperformance, the problem will be the same with non-
executive independent directors; in fact, it may be even worse, since independent 
directors may not have a strong relationship with the company.  One lesson to be 
learnt from Volkswagen is that governments should consider carefully before 
introducing legislation that accommodates employee representatives on the board.  
There have been several other suggestions, such as having more employees 
holding the equity of the company; “broader capital ownership would curb income 
and wealth inequality, expand investment and employment, and reduce the demand 
for redistribution through the state.”235  This may be a wise option to enable a 
company to benefit and retain valued employees.  However, from the legislation 
perspective, it is not the duty of either the Companies Act or a corporate 
governance code to intervene that much.  On the other hand, if benefitting and 
retaining employees are to draw the attention of regulation, as in German 
companies, perhaps regulations like this may not bring improvements for executive 
remuneration.  
Reports of an increase in general income and the recovery of pay in the public 
sector may indicate that the UK government should refrain from introducing 
additional regulation to promote fairness at the moment.  Perhaps this overall 
increase was one reason why the UK parliament turned down a law on reporting 
pay ratios and placing employee representatives on boards to negotiate payment 
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issues.236  The UK is still a country with the default shareholder primacy norm 
embedded in company law and corporate culture.237  Additionally, while workers’ 
wages are increasing at their fastest rate for six years,238 and in the context of the 
UK’s smooth economic recovery, which has shown a decrease in unemployment 
and inflation since 2011,239 there will be fewer opportunities to regulate for a pay 
cap in this country.  Pay inequality can be controlled by corporate governance, but 
if long-term firm productivity is not affected by the pay gap, then inequity 
problems may not addressed by law.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Mooney suggested that executive remuneration should be simplified in 
structure, and reforms should push companies to reduce the complexity of their 
reports.240  However, this suggestion for simplifying pay structures probably stems 
from only a partial understanding of pay structures and practices.  It is difficult to 
avoid complexity in executive pay because it derives from variation in the 
incentives set for managers, even though these incentive’s aims can be stated 
simply and clearly in pay reports and policies.  It is the job of remuneration 
committees and boards to make those aims accountable to shareholders for 
resolution.  Since the movement in favor of “shareholder say on pay” has become a 
popular legislative approach but also has proved to have implementation 
difficulties, current regulations should build upon present foundations to improve 
the quality of shareholder monitoring.  
Due to variation in cultures and industries, each government has a unique 
method of regulating remuneration practice.  This article only provides suggestions 
for legislations that are useful under general regulatory conditions.  In relation to 
shareholders’ voting power, this article proposes to improve understanding of the 
complexity of remuneration reports.  Shareholders should have a meeting before 
they vote on executive remuneration issues, to improve their understanding of the 
complexity of the remuneration report.  In order to prevent pay for 
underperformance among executive directors, shareholders should have a binding 
vote on the implementation pay reports of executives who are going to leave the 
company.  In relation to board accountability, suggestions have been made that 
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facilitate better communication with shareholders.  A concision requirement should 
be imposed on remuneration reporting content and structure, perhaps via the 
corporate governance code.  In order to promote the independence of board 
members and their negotiation with executive directors on executive remuneration, 
legislation should be introduced to impose liabilities upon members who do not 
fulfil their duty of care.  From the perspective of pay for performance, companies’ 
long-term interests may be promoted through executive remuneration structure 
adjustment.  Regulations should encourage companies to increase the executives’ 
shareholding period after these shares have been exercised, and companies should 
disclose the economic cost of issuing restricted share options to executive 
directors.  These proposals cannot guarantee that executive compensation levels 
will be reduced, but they may make remuneration practices, such as shareholder 
engagement in reports and remuneration committee accountability, more efficient.  
Shareholders’ engagement in shareholding meetings and their passivity in 
relation to corporate governance are still huge concerns.  However, with the 
globalization of the shareholder say on pay as a corporate governance measure to 
align pay with performance, evidence has shown that there is a trend towards 
participating in pay resolutions among international mutual funds, pension funds, 
hedge funds, and individual investors.241  Although providing shareholders with a 
say on pay does not necessarily lead to pay for performance and promote the 
company’s long-term success, with more investors who are knowledgeable about 
and willing to engage in remuneration practice, shareholders’ intervention may 
develop in a positive direction.  
Additionally, from the point of view of executive directors’ incentives, several 
metrics have been designed to award managers for their leadership, community 
skills, and teamwork, as long as these performances result in effective 
management.  Financial performance measures are usually calculated on a 
quantitative basis, but these non-financial performance criteria are qualitative.242  
The standards for paying managers for their non-financial performance may be 
quite subjective compared to financial incentive schemes.  Current concerns about 
the relationship between remuneration committees and executive managers will 
make it even harder for legislation to provide appropriate methods to pay directors 
for their efforts, ethics, and reputations. 
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